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ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT ABOARD
AIRPLANES: AN ANALYSIS OF THE NEED FOR
REPORTING REQUIREMENTS AT 35,000 FEET
MADISON L. GEORGE*
ABSTRACT
Currently, airlines have no legal duty to report an in-flight
sexual assault to law enforcement. This lack of a duty to report
hinders investigations, prevents victims from receiving closure,
and imposes additional liability on air carriers. This Comment
suggests imposing a mandatory and uniform reporting require-
ment on commercial airlines. This requirement would better as-
sist travelers and help limit airlines’ liability for in-flight sexual
assault.
By examining the purposes and policies of other mandated
reporting laws, it is apparent that the airline industry is an apt
place to instill a duty to report. Requiring airlines to report in-
flight sexual assault would follow the current trend of making
reporting requirements commonplace in the professional and
corporate spheres. Pending legislation on this topic has signifi-
cant shortcomings, but this Comment argues that it is nonethe-
less important and should be expanded in the near future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
IN JANUARY 2018, DURING A Spirit Airlines overnight flight,a twenty-three-year-old victim  awoke to a stranger “mo-
lest[ing] her with his hands.”1 At trial, she testified that she felt
frozen and petrified.2 The assailant was sentenced to nine years
in federal prison.3
Unfortunately, this is far from an isolated incident. For exam-
ple, in May 2019, a Massachusetts man was indicted for sexual
assault after he allegedly molested a nineteen-year-old United
Airlines passenger.4 In November 2019, an American Airlines
flight bound for Salt Lake City, Utah had to be diverted to
1 Associated Press, Man in U.S. on Work Visa Gets 9 Years in Prison for Sex Assault




4 David Oliver, Passenger Indicted for Alleged Mid-Flight Sexual Assault of 19-Year-
Old Woman, USA TODAY (May 21, 2019), https://www.usatoday.com/story/
travel/flights/2019/05/21/united-airlines-passenger-alleges-sexual-assault/
3751023002/ [https://perma.cc/X64B-JWAL].
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Tulsa, Oklahoma for the arrest of an assailant after he allegedly
grabbed the crotch of a woman sitting next to him who was trav-
eling with her daughter.5 Additionally, not all assailants are pun-
ished. Even more recently, a class action lawsuit was filed against
Frontier Airlines alleging the airline mishandled multiple cases
of in-flight sexual assault and that they lack proper reporting
procedures.6 All of these cases illustrate the increasingly impor-
tant issue of sexual assault on airplanes and airlines’ responses
to these crimes.
According to the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), from
2014 to 2017, the number of reported in-flight sexual assault
cases went from thirty-eight to sixty-three.7 This number may
seem small, but numerous sexual assaults occurring on airplanes
go unreported each year.8 One in five flight attendants claims
they have experienced a report of passenger-on-passenger sex-
ual assault.9 These same flight attendants report that law en-
forcement was notified or met the plane at the gate less than
half of the time.10 In some cases, law enforcement responds to
the assaults because airline crewmembers choose to report.11
Yet, company policy is currently the only guide for reporting on
airlines, which results in law enforcement not knowing about—
much less investigating—numerous other cases.12
Current aviation and criminal laws fail to address the problem
of sexual assault aboard aircraft. To better serve travelers, the
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) or the Transportation
and Security Administration (TSA) should create a uniform,
5 Mariel Padilla, Man Charged in Sexual Assault of Woman on a Flight, Officials Say,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 8, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/08/us/american-
airlines-passenger-groping.html [https://perma.cc/24V4-5MF8].
6 Hally Freger, Class Action Lawsuit Claims Frontier Airlines Mishandled Cases of In-
Flight Sexual Assault, ABC NEWS (Dec. 17, 2019), https://abcnews.go.com/Busi
ness/class-action-lawsuit-claims-frontier-airlines-mishandled-cases/story?id=67787
731 [perma.cc/E8K6-9SDR].








12 See Jamie Freed, In-Flight Sexual Assaults Often Unreported; Airlines Need to Step
Up, REUTERS (Dec. 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-india-actor-as-
sault-airlines-analysis/in-flight-sexual-assaults-often-unreported-airlines-need-to-
step-up-idUSKBN1E80YN [perma.cc/9RYY-TW72].
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mandatory reporting requirement that requires commercial air-
line staff to disclose reported instances of in-flight sexual assault
to law enforcement. Part II of this Comment will discuss two
cases which brought airlines’ nonreporting to the media’s atten-
tion. Part III will address the current state of the relevant U.S.
aviation law; this includes the liability airlines currently face for
in-flight sexual assault, the government’s authority over crimes
aboard aircraft, and pending legislation. Part IV will address
shortcomings in pending legislation to show why more stringent
reporting laws are necessary. Part V will examine other report-
ing requirements and how their purposes and policies extend to
the airline industry. Part VI will address the benefits of a uni-
form, mandatory reporting requirement. Lastly, Part VII will
provide a conclusion by laying out steps Congress should take.
II. RALLYING THE MEDIA
If a flight attendant or other airline crewmember is notified of
an in-flight sexual assault, there is no mandatory reporting re-
quirement or other uniform procedure for handling such an
incident.13 Prior to this decade, the treatment and lack of re-
porting of in-flight sexual assaults was rarely discussed, but it has
garnered media attention in the past few years. This is partially
due to two highly publicized cases—both of which illustrate the
seriousness of nonreporting.14
13 See Andrew Appelbaum, Recent In-Flight Sexual Abuse Complaints to Feds Re-
leased by Airline Passenger Group . . . Nothing Done?, FLYERS RIGHTS (Nov. 29, 2018),
https://flyersrights.org/press-release/recent-in-flight-sexual-abuse-complaints-to-
feds-released-by-airline-passenger-group/ [perma.cc/529A-68GD]; Shannon Mc-
Mahon, What to Do if In-Flight Sexual Assault Happens to You, SMARTERTRAVEL (Mar.
19, 2018), https://www.smartertravel.com/flight-sexual-assault-what-to-do/
[perma.cc/BQT6-JD87]; see also Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7 (not-
ing “in most cases” law enforcement will be available to respond if the flight crew
is immediately notified and encouraging victims to reach out to the FBI
themselves).
14 The #MeToo movement has also influenced the attention devoted to in-
flight sexual assault as its massive impact continues to result in increased report-
ing of sexual crimes in all contexts. See, e.g., Frankie Wallace, How the #MeToo
Movement Has Affected the Airline Industry, AERONAUTICS AVIATION NEWS & MEDIA
(Aug. 5, 2019), https://aeronauticsonline.com/how-the-metoo-movement-has-af-
fected-the-airline-industry/ [perma.cc/J385-Z6ZG]. The breadth of this move-
ment and its influence on the airline industry, however, is outside the scope of
this Comment.
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A. DVALADZE V. DELTA AIR LINES, INC.
The first largely publicized case shows how nonreporting can
result in an assailant getting away. In 2018, Allison Dvaladze
sued Delta Air Lines, alleging she was assaulted by a stranger
mid-flight.15 Dvaladze stated that she told the crewmembers of
the incident immediately but received unsatisfactory re-
sponses.16 One flight attendant told Dvaladze to let it “roll off
her back” and that sexual assault occurs frequently on flights.17
Upon landing, crewmembers did not report the incident to law
enforcement, and the alleged assailant was never identified or
arrested.18 Since then, Dvaladze has frequently discussed her
case with the media.19 It was even brought to the FBI’s attention
and used in their campaign to raise awareness regarding the
dangers of in-flight sexual assault.20
B. SARDINAS V. UNITED AIRLINES
Another largely discussed case, citing the Dvaladze incident in
its own complaint, shows how nonreporting hinders law enforce-
ment investigations.21 A teenager flying unaccompanied on
United Airlines (United) woke up mid-flight to a stranger as-
saulting her.22 The victim caught a flight attendant’s attention
who proceeded to “chastise” the assailant, telling him his actions
15 Complaint for Damages at 3–4, Dvaladze v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 2:18-cv-
00297-RSL (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2019), ECF No. 1; see also Order of Dismissal,
Dvaladze, No. 2:18-cv-00297-RSL, ECF No. 22 (noting case was later dismissed pur-
suant to settlement).
16 Complaint for Damages at 4–5, Dvaladze, No. 2:18-cv-00297-RSL.
17 Id. at 4.
18 Id. at 5; see also Avi Selk, She Says She Was Groped on a Delta Flight—Then Told to




19 E.g., Mary Louise Kelly, 36,000 Feet in the Air, Flight Attendants and Passengers
Say ‘Me, Too’, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (June 21, 2018), https://www.npr.org/tran-
scripts/622361890 [https://perma.cc/K253-H3F8]; Matthew Halverson, The Un-
friendly Skies: Why Sexual Assault Still Plagues Air Travel, CONDÉ NAST TRAVELER
(Mar. 29, 2017), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/the-unfriendly-skies-why-sex-
ual-assault-still-plagues-air-travel [perma.cc/C5QZ-P9PA].
20 See Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7.
21 Complaint at 3, Sardinas v. United Airlines, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA (Wash.
Super. Ct.-King Cnty. Feb. 22, 2019), ECF No. 1-1.
22 Id. at 4–5; see also Amy Clancy, Seattle Teen: United Airlines ‘Negligent’ for In-
Flight Sexual Assault, KIRO 7 (Nov. 22, 2019), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local
/tonight-at-5-30-seattle-teen-united-airlines-negligent-for-in-flight-sexual-assault/
950947481/ [perma.cc/R7VF-6JS].
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were “not cool.”23 Yet, the assailant was allowed to walk off the
plane undeterred as United never notified law enforcement.24
Instead, the victim reported the assault to her mother who, in
turn, notified law enforcement.25 Luckily, unlike in Dvaladze, the
assailant was later identified, arrested, and convicted.26
Both of these instances illustrate that the lack of a mandatory
reporting requirement for in-flight sexual assault leads to ad-
verse consequences. These cases, along with others, have gar-
nered media attention and forced our legislative and executive
branches to examine the current state of the law regarding in-
flight assault.27
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. LIABILITY FOR AIRLINES
Prior to the late 1990s, sex on airplanes—consensual or other-
wise—was rarely discussed.28 It is unknown if this is due to a lack
of reporting, a cover-up mentality, or it just did not occur. None-
theless, in the past few decades courts have recognized a prob-
lem on both domestic and international flights and have come
up with avenues of liability to hold airlines accountable.29 The
remainder of this Part will discuss liability for both international
and domestic airlines.
1. Liability for International Air Carriers
In the 2000 case Wallace v. Korean Air, the Second Circuit
found that an international air carrier could be liable for inju-
ries arising from passenger-on-passenger sexual assault occur-
23 Clancy, supra note 22.
24 Complaint at 5, Sardinas, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA; Clancy, supra note 22.
25 Complaint at 5–6, Sardinas, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA; Clancy, supra note 22.
26 See Complaint at 5–6, Sardinas, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA; Clancy, supra note 22.
27 See Rene Marsh & Juana Summers, Women Detail Sexual Assaults and Harass-
ment on Commercial Flights, CNN (Dec. 28, 2017), https://www.cnn.com/2017/
12/27/politics/women-sexual-assaults-harassment-commercial-flights/index.
html [perma.cc/Q33G-7N68] (containing additional instances of victims com-
plaining of airlines’ responses to in-flight sexual assaults).
28 See Asra Q. Nomani, A New Problem for the Airlines: Sexual Misconduct at 37,000
Feet, WALL ST. J. (June 10, 1998), https://www.wsj.com/articles/
SB897364901819356000 [https://perma.cc/H5FB-DQRQ].
29 Id.; see also Judith R. Karp, Mile High Assaults: Air Carrier Liability Under the
Warsaw Convention, 66 J. AIR L. & COM. 1551, 1553 (2001) (“[I]n 1997, one-third
of the reported cases of ‘unruly behavior’ among airplane passengers involved
sexual misconduct.”).
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ring mid-flight.30 Similarly, in Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., an
Illinois federal district court held that a victim could sue for in-
juries if the airline failed to act after a passenger-on-passenger
sexual assault on a transatlantic flight.31 In reaching this hold-
ing, the court found that the airline contributed to the attack by
continuing to serve the alleged assailant alcohol after receiving
complaints and refusing to intervene.32 Courts have subse-
quently held that liability extends to international air carriers
regardless of the victim’s gender.33 Likewise, airlines on domes-
tic flights can be held liable for passenger-on-passenger sexual
assault.
2. Liability for Airlines as Common Carriers
Liability for airlines on domestic flights originates primarily
from the classification of airlines as common carriers. U.S. law
has long recognized this categorization.34 Being a common car-
rier imposes a heightened duty of care for airlines on domestic
flights, which makes them liable for foreseeable criminal acts,
including sexual misconduct.35 The test for liability is “whether
such an incident was foreseeable under the circumstances of the
case or whether the air carrier owed a heightened duty to the
passenger due to a special relationship.”36 For example, in R.M.
v. American Airlines, Inc., a minor’s parents sued American Air-
lines after their daughter was sexually assaulted mid-flight.37 The
court held that airlines, as common carriers, are subject to a
heightened duty of care; however, this crime was not foreseeable
30 Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 296 (2d Cir. 2000); see also Karp, supra
note 29, at 1561.
31 Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No. 97C0320, 1997 WL 767278, at *1 (N.D.
Ill. Dec. 1, 1997); see also Jonathan E. DeMay, Marissa N. Lefland & Constantine J.
Petallides, In-Flight Sexual Misconduct: Congressional Action and Air Carrier Liability,
2019 ABA FORUM ON AIR & SPACE L. ANN. CONF., Sept. 12–13, 2019, at 1, 9–10.
32 Tsevas, 1997 WL 767278, at *10; see also DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 9–10.
33 E.g., Langadinos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 69 (1st Cir. 2000); Karp,
supra note 29, at 1563–64.
34 See 45 U.S.C. § 181; 49 U.S.C. § 40102(a)(25), (27); Am. Airlines, Inc. v. N.
Am. Airlines, Inc., 351 U.S. 79, 84 (1956); Paul T. David, Federal Regulation of
Airplane Common Carriers, 6 J. LAND & PUB. UTIL. ECON. 359, 360 (1930).
35 DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13; see also R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F.
Supp. 3d 1203, 1213–14 (D. Or. 2018).
36 DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13.
37 R.M., 338 F. Supp. 3d at 1205. Note that the assailant pleaded guilty to “As-
sault with Intent to Commit Sexual Contact of a Minor and Indecent Sexual Pro-
posal to a Minor.” Id. at 1207.
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enough for the airline to be liable.38 The facts indicated that (1)
the defendant was not intoxicated; (2) the attack was noticed by
a flight attendant; (3) the passengers were separated; (4) law
enforcement was notified immediately; and (5) law enforcement
met the assailant upon landing.39
Conversely, in other cases, such as Thompson v. Hawaiian Air-
lines, Inc., courts have found some in-flight crimes foreseeable
enough to hold airlines responsible in their common carrier
role.40 In Thompson, the court denied the defendant airline’s
motion for summary judgment when it found the foreseeability
of an in-flight sexual assault was a question of fact.41 The plain-
tiff in Thompson alleged that her assailant was visibly intoxicated
prior to boarding and that the flight attendants continued to
serve him alcohol.42 She woke up mid-flight to the assailant
touching her groin.43 While a jury later ruled the plaintiff take
nothing, the court’s recognition that airlines can be liable for
their passenger’s actions on domestic flights is relevant and fol-
lowed by most states.44
Despite continued recognition of airline liability for in-flight
sexual assault, little has been done to encourage specific proto-
cols and reporting when an in-flight assault occurs. This is true
even though courts, federal legislators, and the media recognize
the problem of in-flight sexual assault.45 The executive and legis-
lative branches did not begin widely discussing mandated re-
porting for airlines until 2018.46 One possible reason for this is
the prior lack of media attention on the subject. Another possi-
38 Id. at 1215.
39 Id. at 1206–07.
40 Thompson v. Hawaiian Airlines, Inc., No. CV 09-4515 CAS (PLAx), 2010 WL
1151431, at *5 (C.D. Cal. July 19, 2010).
41 Id.
42 Id. at *2.
43 Id.
44 See Judgment at 1, Thompson, 2010 WL 1151431 (No. CV09-4515 CAS
(PLAx)), ECF No. 154; DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13.
45 See, e.g., R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1215 (D. Or. 2018)
(“undeniably a serious issue for airlines today”); Stop Sexual Assault and Harass-
ment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019) (describing
proposed legislation to address sexual harassment in public transportation);
Karen Schwartz, Recent Incidents Put a New Focus on Sexual Assault on Airplanes, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 20, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/20/travel/recent-in-
cidents-put-a-new-focus-on-sexual-assault-on-airplanes.html [perma.cc/G2ZY-
SMYV].
46 See H.R. 5139; FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254,
§ 339A, 132 Stat. 3186, 3282 (2018).
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ble explanation is that Congress does not want to meddle with
company policy. While the latter explanation promotes airlines
having free reign over their own business, it lacks merit consid-
ering the broad authority already bestowed on the federal gov-
ernment to regulate airlines.
B. THE GOVERNMENT’S AUTHORITY OVER CRIMES ON AIRCRAFT
While airline jurisdictional questions are convoluted and gen-
erally outside the scope of this Comment, the U.S. government
possesses vast authority over airlines—particularly as it relates to
criminal offenses like sexual assault. This authority, stemming
from both the Constitution and federal statutes, is more than
enough to initiate a mandated reporting requirement. The re-
mainder of this Part will discuss the U.S. government’s constitu-
tional and statutory authority to regulate airlines.
1. Constitutional Authority
First, the U.S. Constitution’s Commerce Clause states that
Congress shall have the power “to regulate commerce with for-
eign nations, and among the several states.”47 This power rapidly
expanded throughout the twentieth century and has been inter-
preted to mean that Congress may regulate (1) channels of in-
terstate commerce; (2) instrumentalities of interstate commerce
or persons or things in interstate commerce; and (3) activities
which substantially affect interstate commerce.48 A commercial
plane arguably fits into all three of these categories.49 There-
fore, “[i]n the context of aviation law, courts generally uphold
the federal government’s efforts to regulate even intrastate air
travel.”50
Additionally, under the Constitution’s Supremacy Clause, the
“laws of the United States” are the “supreme law of the land”
regardless of the “laws of any State to the contrary.”51 This
means any valid federal laws will take precedence over conflict-
47 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
48 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558–59 (1995).
49 MICHAEL W. PEARSON & DANIEL S. RILEY, FOUNDATIONS OF AVIATION LAW 28
(2015).
50 Id.; see also United States v. Knowles, 197 F. Supp. 3d 143, 155–56 (D.C. Cir.
2016) (holding “Congress may regulate an instrumentality of both interstate and
foreign commerce—an airplane . . . pursuant to its commerce powers.”).
51 U.S. CONST. art. VI.
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ing state laws.52 States must adhere to these laws; they cannot
turn a blind eye to the federal government’s decisions—so long
as they are constitutional.53 Congress consequently has the con-
stitutional authority to create a mandatory reporting require-
ment for commercial airlines under the Commerce Clause.
Under the Supremacy Clause, all airlines would have to adhere
to this requirement regardless of state laws.
2. Statutory Authority
Under the Commerce Clause’s authority, the legislature has
already enacted numerous statutes regulating airlines and in-
flight crimes. Under 49 U.S.C. § 40103, the U.S. government has
“exclusive sovereignty of airspace of the United States.”54 Under
49 U.S.C. § 46506, certain in-flight actions considered crimes in
the territorial United States are made criminal so long as they
are committed within the United States’ “special aircraft juris-
diction.”55 This statute includes sexual abuse offenses.56 Essen-
tially, all U.S. aircraft or any aircraft in the United States is
within the special aircraft jurisdiction.57 In the case of in-flight
assaults, the FBI generally has investigative jurisdiction—so long
as they are actually reported.58
Congress does not possess exclusive interest in aviation laws
and regulations. Regarding commercial aviation, Congress has
delegated authority to two executive agencies. First, the FAA has
authority to regulate any U.S. civil aviation activities.59 Since its
52 Id.; see Armstrong v. Exceptional Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324 (2015)
(“[T]his [Supremacy] Clause creates a rule of decision: Courts ‘shall’ regard the
‘Constitution,’ and all laws ‘made in Pursuance thereof,’ as ‘the supreme Law of
the Land.’ They must not give effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws.”).
53 See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18–19 (1958) (holding the Constitution is
the supreme law of the land, and state legislatures do not have the authority to
nullify Supreme Court or other federal court decisions).
54 49 U.S.C. § 40103(a)(1).
55 Id. § 46506(1); see also 1412. Certain Crimes Aboard Aircraft in Flight—49 U.S.C.
46506, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-man-
ual-1412-certain-crimes-aboard-aircraft-flight-49-usc-46506 [perma.cc/C55F-
ZUBR].
56 49 U.S.C. § 46506; 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–2248; 1412. Certain Crimes Aboard Air-
craft in Flight—49 U.S.C. 46506, supra note 55.
57 49 U.S.C. § 46501(2).
58 Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7.
59 Federal Aviation Administration, U.S. DEP’T OF TRANSP., https://www.transpor-
tation.gov/briefing-room/safetyfirst/federal-aviation-administration [perma.cc/
TEX6-N86P]; see also Federal Aviation Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 75 Stat.
737 (repealed and re-codified without substantive change at 49 U.S.C.
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creation in 1958, the FAA has grown tremendously and is now in
charge of providing the “safest, most efficient aerospace system
in the world.”60 Some of the FAA’s main tasks include develop-
ing programs to combat the environmental impact of airplanes;
regulating commercial space transportation as well as civil avia-
tion; and setting safety standards for planes and crewmembers.61
On October 5, 2018, President Trump signed into law the FAA
Reauthorization Act of 2018 (FAA Reauthorization Act), which
extended the FAA’s authority (and funding) until 2023.62
Second, TSA is another executive agency with authority relat-
ing to airline transportation. Created in response to the Septem-
ber 11th terrorist attacks,63 some of TSA’s main tasks include
organizing and implementing all security screenings for passen-
gers at U.S. airports; liaising with law enforcement regarding
transportation security; and enforcing security-related regula-
tions.64 TSA also controls the federal air marshals. The air mar-
shals are “federal law enforcement officers deployed on
passenger flights worldwide to protect airline passengers and
crew against the risk of criminal and terrorist violence.”65
Though both agencies regulate aviation safety, the FAA’s mis-
sion indirectly helps keep passengers safe by creating safety stan-
dards, while TSA is directly responsible for passenger security in
all modes of transportation.66 Considering the authority granted
to each agency, either should have the power to create and im-
plement a mandated reporting requirement for commercial air-
lines. While TSA seems the more logical choice due to its
connection to passenger security and its law enforcement pow-
ers, the FAA Reauthorization Act directed the Secretary of
Transportation to establish a task force addressing the issue of
§§ 40101–40105) (stating the FAA has authority over regulations and promotion
of civil aviation).
60 Safety: The Foundation of Everything We Do, FED. AVIATION ADMIN., https://
www.faa.gov/about/safety_efficiency/ [perma.cc/7JNT-S9MM]; see 49 U.S.C.
§ 40103(b)(1).
61 See Safety, The Foundation of Everything We Do, supra note 60; see 49 U.S.C.
§§ 40101–40130 (laying out the general policies and duties of the FAA).
62 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, 132 Stat. 3186
(2018).
63 See Mission, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN., https://www.tsa.gov/about/tsa-mis-
sion [perma.cc/TEX6-N86P]; see also 49 U.S.C. § 114(f).
64 49 U.S.C. § 114.
65 Federal Air Marshal Service and Law Enforcement, U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN.,
https://www.tsa.gov/about/jobs-at-tsa/federal-air-marshal-service-and-law-en-
forcement [perma.cc/U5EQ-JBJP]; 49 U.S.C. § 44917.
66 49 U.S.C. § 114(f); Mission, supra note 63.
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in-flight sexual misconduct.67 This task force, as well as the Stop
Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act (House
Bill 5139)—a bill recently passed by the House of Representa-
tives—lay the groundwork for mandated reporting of in-flight
sexual assaults.68
C. PENDING LEGISLATION
While Congress has said each airplane should have policies to
address in-flight sexual misconduct that include “facilitat[ing]
the reporting of sexual misconduct to appropriate law enforce-
ment agencies,”69 there is no mandatory reporting requirement
even if an assault is reported to airline staff.70 The burden is
entirely on the airline itself to create and adhere to a reporting
policy.71 At most, a failure to report may be a factor when deter-
mining the airlines’ civil liability for the assault.72 The rest of
Section C will discuss pending legislation that could address the
issue of airline nonreporting including the FAA Reauthorization
Act and House Bill 5139.
1. FAA Reauthorization Act
In 2018, Congress and President Trump addressed in-flight
sexual misconduct in the FAA Reauthorization Act,73 which di-
rected the Secretary of Transportation to create the National In-
Flight Sexual Misconduct Task Force (Task Force).74 The Task
Force’s primary function is to review the current practices, pro-
tocols, and requirements of airlines when responding to alleged
sexual misconduct in-flight—this includes review of an airline’s
training, reporting, and data collection.75 The Task Force’s sec-
ondary function is to make recommendations based on their re-
view of the airline’s protocols and firsthand accounts from
passengers who have experienced in-flight sexual misconduct.76
67 FAA Reauthorization Act § 339A.
68 See id. §§ 339A, 339B; Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation
Act, H.R. 5139, 116th Cong. (1st Sess. 2019).
69 FAA Reauthorization Act § 338(1)(B).
70 See Appelbaum, supra note 13 (noting that there are no mandatory report-
ing requirements so airlines may report according to their own policies).
71 See FAA Reauthorization Act § 338(1).
72 See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Sardinas v. United Airlines, No. 19-2-01663-9 SEA
(Wash. Super. Ct.-King Cnty. Jan. 17, 2019), E.C.F. No. 1-1.
73 FAA Reauthorization Act §§ 339A, 339B.
74 Id. § 339A(a).
75 Id. § 339A(a)(1).
76 Id. § 339A(a)(2).
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The Task Force’s purposes are six-fold. First, the Task Force
recommends ways to address sexual assault on planes; this could
include airline employee and contractor training.77 Second, the
Task Force suggests ways for passengers involved in an in-flight
sexual assault to report it.78 The Attorney General uses these rec-
ommendations to “establish a streamlined process” for “individ-
uals involved in incidents of alleged sexual misconduct onboard
aircraft to report such allegations” in a way that protects their
privacy.79 Third, the Task Force suggests means of providing
data of in-flight sexual misconduct while protecting the victims’
privacy and preventing the public from identifying an individual
air carrier.80 Fourth, the Task Force is to “issue recommenda-
tions for flight attendants, pilots, and other appropriate airline
personnel on law enforcement notification in incidents of al-
leged sexual misconduct.”81 Fifth, the Task Force reviews and
uses firsthand accounts from passengers who have been as-
saulted in-flight, and, sixth, the Task Force does anything else it
deems necessary.82
The FAA Reauthorization Act requires that the Task Force
consist of representatives from (1) the Department of Transpor-
tation (DOT); (2) the Department of Justice; (3) national orga-
nizations that specialize in helping sexual assault victims; (4)
labor organizations that represent flight attendants and pilots;
(5) airports; (6) air carriers; (7) state and local law enforcement
agencies; and (8) other federal agencies and stakeholder organi-
zations deemed necessary.83 These representatives ensure the in-
terests of all groups or individuals affected by in-flight sexual
assault are represented. While the FAA Reauthorization Act is a
step in the right direction and has prompted discussion of in-
flight sexual assault, it leaves a lot to be desired regarding an
airline’s responsibility to report.
2. House Bill 5139: Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in
Transportation Act
Representative Peter DeFazio recognized the legislative gap in
reporting requirements when he introduced House Bill 5139 to
77 Id. § 339A(c)(1).
78 Id. § 339A(c)(2).
79 Id. § 339B(a).
80 Id. § 339A(c)(3).
81 Id. § 339A(c)(4).
82 Id. § 339A(c)(5)–(6).
83 Id. § 339A(b).
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the House of Representatives.84 The main purpose of House Bill
5139, which is still under review, is to “protect transportation
personnel and passengers from sexual assault and harass-
ment.”85 To that end, it has an entire section devoted to the
sexual assault and harassment policies of foreign and domestic
air carriers.86 While House Bill 5139 is not yet as detailed as the
FAA Reauthorization Act, it better addresses airlines’ responsi-
bility in preventing and reporting sexual assault.87 As it stands,
House Bill 5139 would require all commercial airlines to create
a formal in-flight sexual assault policy with five requirements.88
First, the policy must state that sexual assault or harassment is
always unacceptable.89 Second, the policy must include proce-
dures to facilitate a victim’s reporting, including appropriate
public outreach activities and confidential ways to report.90
Third, the airlines must limit or prohibit future travel by an as-
sailant.91 Fourth, the policy must mandate training for airline
personnel who may receive reports of in-flight assault and train-
ing to recognize and respond to potential human trafficking vic-
tims.92 Fifth, and most importantly, the policy would require
specific “procedures that personnel should follow upon the re-
porting of a transportation sexual assault or harassment inci-
dent, including actions to protect affected individuals from
continued sexual assault or harassment and to notify law enforce-
ment when appropriate.”93
To make House Bill 5139 more palatable to air carriers, it also
states that compliance with these requirements would not defin-
itively determine whether the airline fell below any requisite
standard of care.94 This essentially prevents noncompliance with
House Bill 5139 from becoming a per se determination of liabil-
84 Press Release, Rep. Peter DeFazio, Chair DeFazio Introduces Legislation to





86 Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. pmbl., § 41727 (1st Sess. 2019).
87 See id.
88 Id.
89 Id. § 41727(b)(1).
90 Id. § 41727(b)(2).
91 Id. § 41727(b)(4).
92 Id. § 41727(b)(5).
93 Id. § 41727(b)(3) (emphasis added).
94 See id. § 41727(d).
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ity for the air carrier; however, this safeguard does not prevent a
court from reviewing noncompliance with the reporting re-
quirement as a factor in deciding liability. Yet, as promising as
the FAA Reauthorization Act and House Bill 5139 are, there are
still issues to be addressed.
IV. SHORTCOMINGS IN PENDING LEGISLATION
A. THE FAA REAUTHORIZATION ACT
As the remainder of this Part will address, both the FAA
Reauthorization Act and House Bill 5139 fail to fully solve the
issue of nonreporting of in-flight sexual assaults. While the FAA
Reauthorization Act is a step in the right direction, it places the
burden of reporting on the victim, not the airline.95 In some
ways, it even places the protection of airlines over passenger
safety. For instance, the Task Force’s third purpose, encourag-
ing data collection, is vital, as instances of in-flight sexual assault
are underreported.96 More accurate information could lead to
better prevention tactics. Yet, by failing to pair sexual assault
data with specific airlines, the public cannot consider safety as a
factor when choosing an airline. It appears this is an attempt to
protect air carriers from liability and economic loss, which may
not be considerate of the safety of future travelers.
The Task Force’s fourth purpose—to issue recommendations
for airline crewmembers on how to report to law enforcement—
is the most relevant to this Comment.97 While the FAA
Reauthorization Act is worded ambiguously, one can assume the
Task Force is meant to address reporting requirements for com-
mercial airline crewmembers. Yet, there is no further mention
of requiring airlines to report. Instead, the FAA Reauthorization
Act focuses on ways the victim can report.98 The emphasis on
victim’s reporting is likely an effort to protect the privacy of vic-
tims and to allow them to control whether their assault is re-
ported to law enforcement. While this is commendable, it shifts
the burden from airlines, imposing a duty on the traumatized
victim who generally lacks reporting capability at 35,000 feet.99 If
95 FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-254, § 339B(a), 132 Stat.
3186 (2018).
96 Id. § 339A(c)(3).
97 Id. § 339A(c)(4).
98 See id. § 339B.
99 See Celine Hacobian, Here’s How High Planes Actually Fly, According to Experts,
TIME (June 27, 2018), https://time.com/5309905/how-high-do-planes-fly/
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the victim has already reported the incident to an airline
crewmember, the crewmember should have a duty as a common
carrier to notify law enforcement.
Further, by placing the reporting burden on the victim in-
stead of the airline, the assailant is more likely to get away. Vic-
tims, compared to airline crewmembers, often lack the ability to
easily contact law enforcement until after they have landed.100
This time critically impacts law enforcement’s ability to respond
effectively.101 Cell phones remain largely prohibited and inac-
cessible to passengers in-flight.102 While some airlines sell in-
flight wireless internet,103 this is often unreliable. Further, while
a victim could potentially contact law enforcement using in-
flight wireless internet to send an email, it seems unlikely that
law enforcement will read the email and take action by the time
the plane lands. This impacts the victim’s ability to secure pro-
tection for themselves, hinders law enforcement’s arrest and in-
vestigation, and may endanger another victim.104 Ultimately, the
victim is often unable to seek redress or protection via law en-
forcement until after the plane has landed—potentially after be-
[perma.cc/ARA8-TAUP] (noting that planes generally fly at 31,000 to 38,000
feet).
100 See Fact Sheet – Portable Electronics on Airplanes, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (June
21, 2013), https://www.faa.gov/news/fact_sheets/news_story.cfm?newsId=1477
4#:~:text=Since%201991%2C%20the%20FCC%20has,is%20taxiing%20to%20the
%20gate [https://perma.cc/9QFR-4ZWA] (noting banned cell phone use on air-
planes and that even in newer model planes, when passengers might be allowed
to use their phones after the plane reaches 10,000 feet, cell phones lack the abil-
ity to transmit signals until landing); Portable Electronic Devices, FED. AVIATION AD-
MIN. (Sept. 10, 2019), https://www.faa.gov/about/initiatives/ped/#:~:text=the
%20FAA%20is%20not%20considering,airborne%20calls%20using
%20cell%20phones [https://perma.cc/Z426-LLU3] (“The FAA is not consider-
ing the use of cell phones . . . during flight because Federal Communications
Commission (FCC) regulations currently prohibit any airborne calls using cell
phones.”).
101 WILLIAM SPELMAN & DALE K. BROWN, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., CALLING THE
POLICE: CITIZEN REPORTING OF SERIOUS CRIME, at xix, 61–80 (1984), https://www.
ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/82276NCJRS.pdf [https://perma.cc/9H2A-
WL5W] (finding time it takes to report crime affects possibility of on-scene
arrests).
102 See Fact Sheet – Portable Electronics on Airplanes, supra note 100; Portable Elec-
tronic Devices, supra note 100.
103 See, e.g., Wi-Fi and Connectivity, AM. AIRLINES, https://www.aa.com/i18n/
travel-info/experience/entertainment/wi-fi-and-connectivity.jsp?anchorLoca-
tion=directURL&title=wifi [perma.cc/CDH2-HBCM] (showing ability to
purchase wi-fi on domestic flights).
104 See, e.g., Complaint at 5–6, Sardinas v. United Airlines, 19-2-01663-9 SEA
(Wash. Sup. Ct.-King Cnty. Jan. 17, 2019).
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ing subjected to repeated assaults or attempted assaults.105 While
the Task Force is trying to create a streamlined reporting pro-
cess for the victim of an in-flight assault,106 this seems to focus
on preventing liability for airlines instead of assisting victims and
punishing the offender.
Lastly, the FAA Reauthorization Act does not require TSA
representatives to be part of the Task Force.107 If a mandatory
reporting requirement is created—as this Comment suggests—
the Task Force should include TSA. TSA oversees passenger se-
curity and has more direct ties with law enforcement.108 It would
logically follow that TSA is included and has a say in how to
handle reporting and investigating in-flight sexual assaults. Ad-
ditionally, TSA would likely be the agency responsible for ensur-
ing the alleged assailant does not leave the airport prior to
being detained.
B. HOUSE BILL 5139
House Bill 5139 is a great start to addressing the responsibility
airlines should have in responding to sexual assault. It supple-
ments the FAA Reauthorization Act and recognizes that the air-
line, not just the victim, should report transportation assault and
harassment to law enforcement because they are in a better posi-
105 While it is possible for flight attendants to move victims to seats away from
their assailant, and thus limit their ability to be assaulted again, this is not always
the crewmembers’ response. See, e.g., Nora Caplan-Bricker, Flight Risk, SLATE
(Aug. 31, 2016, 5:58 AM), https://slate.com/human-interest/2016/08/flight-
risk.html [https://perma.cc/VQM7-4A2E] (describing incident where female
passenger was verbally and physically harassed mid-flight and had to beg to move
to different seat); Melanie Cox, Flight and Fight, MARIE CLAIRE (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.marieclaire.com/politics/a33252517/sexual-misconduct-on-air-
planes/ [https://perma.cc/D66R-Z3F2] (discussing woman being groped on a
Frontier Airlines flight and being forced to return to her seat next to assailant
after reporting incident to flight crew). This is likely due to a lack of guidance or
training. See Nathan Wilson, WA Senator Makes New Push to Address Airline Sexual
Assaults, KIRO 7 (June 13, 2018, 11:45 AM), https://www.kiro7.com/news/local/
first-on-kiro-7-wa-senator-makes-new-push-to-address-airline-sexual-assaults/
769083070/ [https://perma.cc/KHU2-XZBG] (reporting 91.5% of flight attend-
ants, out of 2000, received no written guidance or training on how to handle
sexual assault from their airline).
106 FAA Reauthorization Act § 339A(c)(2).
107 See id. § 339A(b).
108 Bob Burns & Jennifer Lapidow, 10 Things You Might Not Know About TSA,
U.S. TRANSP. SEC. ADMIN. BLOG (Oct. 13, 2017), https://www.tsa.gov/blog/2017/
10/13/10-things-you-might-not-know-about-tsa [https://perma.cc/F3GC-44T7].
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tion to do so.109 As House Bill 5139 stands, however, it allows
airlines flexibility to determine their own reporting policies.110
This needs to be amended to provide more specific direction.
One can expect significant pushback from commercial airlines
that may not want to spend the money it would take to imple-
ment a specific reporting policy. This is especially true if the
reporting requirements would mandate updating airplane tech-
nology.111 Nonetheless, while flexibility in company policy is
often beneficial from an economic standpoint, passenger safety
should be prioritized. More specific requirements would (1)
help ensure that an airline cannot find a loophole in the legisla-
tion; and (2) help courts uniformly assess airlines’ responses to
in-flight sexual assaults when determining liability. Further, spe-
cific reporting requirements would assist in ensuring that all in-
flight assaults reported to crewmembers are addressed and
investigated.
Overall, the FAA Reauthorization Act and House Bill 5139 are
conduits of conversation for the issue of in-flight sexual assault.
Yet, more responsibility should be placed on airlines to combat
steadily increasing crime through reporting requirements. By
examining the policies and purposes of other reporting require-
ments, one can see how the pending legislation on this issue
fails to capitalize on the benefits more stringent reporting re-
quirements could incur.
V. OTHER MANDATED REPORTERS
Requiring airlines to report in-flight assaults is consistent with
the policies and purposes of reporting requirements in other
crimes. Further, a uniform mandated reporting policy would
benefit victims and air carriers alike. The remainder of this
Comment will address these two propositions.
109 See Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. § 41727(b)(3) (1st Sess. 2019).
110 Id. (noting there is no specific method to determine when notifying law
enforcement is appropriate or how to do so).
111 For an example of technology that assists airlines in reporting, see Making
Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Misconduct, ALASKA AIR-
LINES: BLOG (Nov. 9, 2018), https://blog.alaskaair.com/values/people/sexual-
harassment-prevention/ [perma.cc/7FCZ-N2D6]. This technology is discussed
further in Part VI, supra.
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“If you see something, say something.”112 This is the slogan
and title of the Department of Homeland Security’s campaign
encouraging ordinary, everyday citizens to report suspicious ac-
tivity to their local law enforcement.113 While this sort of report-
ing is encouraged and arguably imposes a moral duty, there is
no universal law that requires citizens to report criminal activ-
ity.114 Title 18 of the U.S. Code seems to require the reporting of
felonies, but it generally only criminalizes concealment—not
nonreporting.115 Historically, only certain individuals in specific
circumstances have been forced (and not just encouraged) to
report.116
Lately, there has been a trend toward requiring more profes-
sionals and corporations to report criminal activity.117 Requiring
airlines to do the same in the case of sexual assault follows this
trend; however, creating a reporting requirement for in-flight
sexual assault raises the question of whether airlines should be
required to report other in-flight crimes. While reliable statistics
of in-flight crime are difficult to find, research indicates in-flight
theft has been going on for years.118 Similarly, there have been
numerous, highly publicized incidents of in-flight assault.119 If
Congress were to create a reporting requirement for in-flight
sexual assault, it would likely have the surplus benefit of the leg-
islature considering mandated reporting for other in-flight
crimes. While these benefits are outside of the scope of this
Comment, it is useful to recognize the difficulties all in-flight
crime imposes on airlines, passengers, and the justice system as a
whole.
112 If You See Something, Say Something!, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., https://
www.dhs.gov/see-something-say-something [perma.cc/EZX6-7PJM].
113 Id.
114 See Candice Delmas, The Civic Duty to Report Crime and Corruption, 9 LES ATE-
LIERS DE L’ÉTHIQUE 50, 55–56 (2014).
115 18 U.S.C. § 4; Sungyong Kang, In Defense of the “Duty to Report” Crimes, 86
UMKC L. REV. 361, 361 (2017).
116 See generally Sandra Guerra Thompson, The White-Collar Police Force: “Duty to
Report” Statutes in Criminal Law Theory, 11 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 3, 5 (2002)
(detailing types of reporting requirements affecting different professionals).
117 See id.
118 Beth Williams, On-Board Theft: 10 Tips to Protect Valuables While You Snooze in
the Sky, CORP. TRAVEL SAFETY (Dec. 8, 2018), https://www.corporatetravel-
safety.com/safety-tips/airline-on-board-theft/ [perma.cc/9UYH-XJUJ].
119 See, e.g., Madeleine Marr, ‘You’re Out of Control.’ Plane Passenger Hits Husband
with Laptop for Ogling Women, MIA. HERALD (July 24, 2019), miamiherald.com/
news/local/crime/article233056302.html.
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The remainder of this Part will examine three mandatory re-
porting requirements and their underlying policies. It will also
state how these policies could apply to an air carrier’s duty to
report in-flight assaults.
A. CRUISE SHIP REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
First, the Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 (CV-
SSA) requires the owner of a cruise ship to report a crime to the
FBI “as soon as possible after the occurrence on board the vessel
of an incident involving homicide, suspicious death, a missing
United States national, kidnapping, assault with serious bodily
injury, [sexual crimes,] firing or tampering with the vessel, or
theft of money or property in excess of $10,000.”120 Prior to the
creation of this new reporting requirement, cruise ships did not
have to alert law enforcement of crimes occurring on the high
seas.121 The reporting of crimes on cruise ships before 2010 was
self-regulating, just as the airline industry is today.122 “Without a
legal duty, cruise companies ha[d] little incentive to voluntarily
report or investigate crimes on vessels for fear of victims estab-
lishing civil liability against the companies.”123 This lack of re-
porting—combined with the large amount of time that passes
before the FBI can access ships to investigate—posed a substan-
tial problem for addressing onboard sexual assaults and often
left victims without justice or closure.124
When the CVSSA was introduced, Congress observed that sex-
ual assaults were the primary crime occurring on cruise ships
and found issues with a lack of reporting to law enforcement
and the public.125 Congress further recognized the difficulties
facing the FBI for securing crime scenes and investigating wit-
nesses such as competing jurisdictions, being on the high seas,
and the varying nationalities of the victims.126 Accordingly, the
CVSSA was immensely popular and passed with only four “no”
120 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3)(A)(i).
121 Tiffany L. Peyroux, The Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010 Founders on
Its Maiden Voyage, 13 LOY. MAR. L.J. 74, 87 (2014).
122 See id. at 88.
123 Id.
124 See id. at 91–92.
125 Id. at 97–98; see also Jim Walker, Accurate Cruise Crime Statistics Finally Availa-
ble, CRUISE L. NEWS (Oct. 8, 2016), https://www.cruiselawnews.com/2016/10/ar-
ticles/crime/accurate-cruise-crime-statistics-finally-available/ [perma.cc/BKQ5-
TDFP] (noting “sexual assault on cruise ships occurs with a similar regularity as
you might find on land”).
126 Peyroux, supra note 121, at 98.
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votes.127 Part of the CVSSA’s mission was to bring to light crime
on cruise ships and prevent the industry from operating under
“a veil of secrecy.”128 For this reason, the CVSSA allows for civil
and criminal penalties for reporting requirement violations.129
The airline industry and the cruise ship industry should have
the same heightened reporting requirements as both industries
share the same concerns. First, airlines can be held liable for in-
flight sexual assaults just as cruise ships can be held liable for
onboard sexual assaults.130 Thus, there is motivation for airlines
to cover up in-flight crimes to avoid liability. Competition within
both industries provides incentives to avoid lawsuits and losing
money.
Further, just as “emergency 911” is nonexistent on some
cruise ships,131 passengers are usually incapable of reporting
their assault to law enforcement mid-flight.132 Difficulty in con-
tacting law enforcement and receiving an immediate investiga-
tion beg for a mandatory reporting requirement to ensure that
crewmembers who can easily contact law enforcement do so.
Law enforcement can then give advice on how to preserve the
scene, assist the victim, or deal with the assailant. This is true
even if law enforcement cannot investigate until the plane has
landed or the ship has docked.
The airline industry is self-regulating, just as the cruise ship
industry used to be.133 By passing the CVSSA, Congress inti-
mated that self-regulation alone was unsatisfactory for the cruise
line industry.134 The similarities of the industries suggest Con-
gress could find the commercial aviation industry likewise
should not be self-regulating. Both industries carry over 25 mil-
lion passengers a year with 25.8 million global cruise passengers
127 Id. at 101.
128 See id.
129 See 46 U.S.C. § 3507(h)(1).
130 See Leticia M. Diaz, Barry H. Dubner & Nicole McKee, Crimes and Medical
Care on Board Cruise Ships: Do the Statistics Fit the Crimes?, 27 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV.
40, 74 (2014); DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 6–20 (discussing liability for sexual
assault aboard airplanes).
131 Diaz et al., supra note 130, at 63.
132 Note that the CVSSA does require that victims of sexual assault onboard
cruise ships be given means to contact law enforcement; however, the investiga-
tion may still be postponed until the ship is docked. See 46 U.S.C. § 3507(d)(5).
133 See Appelbaum, supra note 13; McMahon, supra note 13 (noting that since
there are no mandatory reporting requirements, different airlines are allowed to
regulate and report in different ways).
134 Cruise Vessel Security and Safety Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-207, § 2, 124
Stat. 2243, 2243–44.
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in 2017135 and 1 billion scheduled airline passengers in 2018.136
Both industries transport travelers in an isolated manner where
they lack the ability to easily contact the outside world if passen-
gers could even determine who to contact. Both industries take
passengers under similar care and control while traveling. It fol-
lows that the policies requiring reporting on cruise ships apply
equally to the airline industry. This is particularly true consider-
ing how many more people travel on airplanes annually than on
cruise ships.137 More passengers, statistically speaking, means
more opportunities for assault and likely more assailants.138 Al-
though passengers remain on cruise ships for longer than they
are on airplanes, many in-flight sexual assaults occur while pas-
sengers are sleeping in their seats.139 On cruise ships, passengers
may sleep in bunk rooms with lockable doors. In some cases,
lockable doors provide assailants an opportunity to shield them-
selves and their crime from onlookers;140 in other cases, lock-
able doors (especially those with peepholes) should provide
some security against assault that is not similarly available to pas-
sengers sleeping on airplanes.141 Accordingly, passengers could
be similarly vulnerable on airlines and cruise ships.
135 2018 Cruise Industry Overview, FLA.-CARIBBEAN CRUISE ASS’N, https://www.f-
cca.com/downloads/2018-Cruise-Industry-Overview-and-Statistics.pdf [perma.
cc/SQA3-Z4NR].
136 2018 Traffic Data for U.S. Airlines and Foreign Airlines U.S. Flights, BUREAU
TRANSP. STATS. (Oct. 2019), https://www.bts.dot.gov/newsroom/2018-traffic-
data-us-airlines-and-foreign-airlines-us-flights [perma.cc/NU4Q-VCWR].
137 See 2018 Cruise Industry Overview, supra note 135; 2018 Traffic Data for U.S.
Airlines and Foreign Airlines U.S. Flights, supra note 136.
138 See Press Release, House Comm. on Transp. & Infrastructure, Chair
DeFazio’s Bill to Curb Sexual Assault and Harrassment in Passenger Transp.
Clears Full House (Oct. 1, 2020), https://transportation.house.gov/news/press-
releases/chair-defazios-bill-to-curb-sexual-assault-and-harassment-in-passenger-
transportation-clears-full-house [https://perma.cc/N2CU-4SKA] (noting 119 re-
ports of in-flight sexual assaults in 2019 alone compared to 260 reported sexual
assaults aboard cruise ships since 2016).
139 E.g., David Williams & Carma Hassan, Man Gets 9 Years for Sexually Assaulting
an Airline Passenger While She Slept, CNN (Dec. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/
2018/12/14/us/airplane-sexual-assault-sentence-trnd/index.html [perma.cc/
B3RT-MQE7].
140 E.g., Cruise Ship Security Practices and Procedure: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Com., Sci., & Transp., 110th Cong. 12 (2007) (statement of Evelyn Fortier, Vice
President, Policy, Rape, Abuse and Incest National Network (RAINN)) (describ-
ing crewmember raping passenger in her cabin room).
141 Emanuella Grinberg, Cruise Ship Security Bill Clears Congress, CNN (July 11,
2010), https://www.cnn.com/2010/TRAVEL/07/01/cruise.ship.bill/index.html
[https://perma.cc/3H5X-QZE6].
2020] ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULTS 691
Lastly, critics of mandatory reporting requirements often say
that requiring a report to law enforcement takes away an indi-
vidual’s autonomy and self-determination—it takes away the vic-
tim’s decision of whether to report for one’s self.142 This
argument fails in the airline and cruise ship context. First, if a
victim reports the incident to crewmembers, whether on a plane
or a cruise, he or she is already reporting the incident to what is
essentially the highest authority available.143 In such isolated cir-
cumstances, the crewmembers are often the only authority
figures readily available to take action against an assailant.144
Second, if a victim is reporting to a crewmember that he or she
has been sexually assaulted, the cruise ship or airline is put on
notice and has an obligation to act to protect other passen-
gers.145 Their liability for negligence may be enhanced if they do
not tell law enforcement of the incident, particularly if the as-
sailant continues traveling and assaulting others.146 It is true that
the victim may only report the incident to crewmembers so they
may switch seats or cabins to avoid their assailant, without in-
tending to report law enforcement. Yet, in passing the CVSSA,
Congress indicated that the danger of allowing the assailant to
go unreprimanded is too great, regardless of a passenger’s moti-
vation for reporting.147 There is no reason this logic should not
extend to the airline industry. The assailant may hurt other pas-
sengers in the future, and the airline should not open itself up
to that sort of liability.
B. CHILD ABUSE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Similarly, the policies underlying child abuse reporting re-
quirements apply to the airline industry. All states require at
least some professional actors to report suspected child abuse to
142 See Joseph W. Barber, The Kids Aren’t All Right: The Failure of Child Abuse
Statutes as a Model for Elder Abuse Statutes, 16 ELDER L.J. 107, 122–23 (2008).
143 Cruise Industry Oversight: Incidents Show Need for Stronger Focus on Consumer
Protection: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Com., Sci., & Transp., 113th Cong. 2
(2013) [hereinafter Cruise Industry Oversight Senate Hearing] (opening statement
by Sen. John D. Rockefeller IV) (describing responsibility cruise ship’s
crewmembers have toward protecting passengers from crime while on board).
144 Id.
145 See K.T. v. Royal Caribbean Cruises, Ltd., 931 F.3d 1041, 1044 (11th Cir.
2019) (overturning a dismissal of a negligence claim against a cruise line when
the crewmembers allegedly knew about sexual crimes against cruise ship
passengers).
146 See id.
147 46 U.S.C. § 3507(g)(3).
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law enforcement.148 This was federally mandated in 1974 when
Congress enacted the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment
Act (CAPTA).149 CAPTA threatened to withhold federal grants
to states if they did not have mandatory reporting require-
ments.150 Since all states had already passed some form of re-
porting law by 1967, CAPTA was essentially a reinforcement
tactic.151 Who is required to report varies by state, but even a
state with the least comprehensive reporting laws still requires
“medical and mental health professionals, school officials, law
enforcement officers,” and those in a “safety-sensitive position”
to report suspected abuse.152 Many of these requirements oc-
curred because the media called for it: “[P]ress and broadcast-
ers created an impetus for child abuse reporting laws.”153
Regardless of how they came about or the specific require-
ments of each state, these reporting requirements all share a
common purpose. The duty to report child abuse is designed to
protect vulnerable children and catch wrongdoers.154 Reporting
notifies law enforcement of an incident and triggers an investi-
gation in hopes of getting the child the help he or she needs, as
well as punishing the wrongdoer and preventing future harm.155
What differentiates child abuse from other crimes, and justifies
its mandated reporting, is the vulnerability of the child. “If an
adult is assaulted, he or she is more likely to be capable of re-
porting the incident to the authorities. Society’s view of chil-
dren, however, is that a child may be too young to protect
himself or too frightened to report the abuse to the appropriate
authorities.”156 The individuals generally required to report—
such as medical professionals or teachers—are in a position to
148 Leonard G. Brown, III & Kevin Gallagher, Mandatory Reporting of Abuse: A
Historical Perspective on the Evolution of States’ Current Mandatory Reporting Laws With
a Review of the Laws in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, 59 VILL. L. REV. TOLLE
LEGE 37, 37 (2013).
149 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101–5119.
150 Brown & Gallagher, supra note 148, at 38.
151 Id. at 37. CAPTA also created a mandatory reporting requirement for cer-
tain people who suspected child abuse on federal property. Id. at 46.
152 Id. at 61 (describing the South Dakota mandatory reporting requirement).
153 Id. at 40.
154 Mary Harter Mitchell, Must Clergy Tell? Child Abuse Reporting Requirements Ver-
sus the Clergy Privilege and Free Exercise of Religion., 71 MINN. L. REV. 723, 727–28
(1987).
155 See id. at 728.
156 Ellen Marrus, Please Keep My Secret: Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confidential-
ity, and Juvenile Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (1998).
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care for the child with access to special knowledge about the
child’s physical or mental well-being.
The purposes underlying reporting requirements of sus-
pected child abuse—protecting the vulnerable and initiating
criminal investigations—support issuing a reporting require-
ment for in-flight sexual assault.157 While the Author does not
intend to trivialize the horrors of child abuse or neglect,158 be-
ing an airline passenger makes one vulnerable. If one is as-
saulted in-flight, they will largely rely on the flight crew for
protection and real-time reporting to law enforcement.159 In
some cases, due to a flight crew’s poor response, victims have
been forced to remain seated next to their assailant.160
Further, crewmembers, like medical professionals and other
mandatory child abuse reporters, are at least knowledgeable
about crimes on airplanes, and they could receive additional
training to respond to these types of situations.161 Moreover,
child abuse is a covert crime—even with mandatory report-
ing.162 Similarly, the isolated nature of an airplane means in-
flight sexual assault is covert.163 Mandatory reporting in that mo-
ment will ensure law enforcement is notified quickly to improve
157 See Mitchell, supra note 154, at 727–28.
158 Marrus, supra note 156, at 514.
159 See Experts Explain Why Sexual Assaults Occur On Airplanes & What Airlines Can
Do to Stop It, ASS’N OF FLIGHT ATTENDANTS-CWA, https://www.afacwa.org/ex-
perts_explain_why_sexual_assaults_occur_on_airplanes_what_airlines_can_do_
to_stop_it [https://perma.cc/BLY3-R75W] (“The particular environment of
planes can also make the experience of surviving sexual assault even more diffi-
cult. . . . [W]hen a victim is violated in a confined space, it can be even more
distressing and exacerbate the feeling of helplessness, vulnerability, and
powerlessness.”) (internal quotations omitted); see Karen Schwartz, How to Protect
Yourself From Sexual Assault on a Plane, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.
nytimes.com/2016/10/21/travel/how-to-protect-yourself-from-sexual-assault-on-
a-plane.html [https://perma.cc/XUD2-EJCK] (stating one of the primary ways to
protect against in-flight sexual assault is to report suspicious activity and any har-
assment to the flight crew and ensure they notify the pilot).
160 See Elisha Fieldstadt, Women Claim They Were Sexually Assaulted on Frontier
Flights and Airline Did Nothing, NBC NEWS (Dec. 26, 2019), https://www.
nbcnews.com/news/us-news/women-claim-they-were-sexually-assaulted-frontier-
flights-airline-did-n1107231 [perma.cc/Z3PU-LGKT].
161 Danny R. Veilleux, Annotation, Validity, Construction, and Application of State
Statute Requiring Doctor or Other Person to Report Child Abuse, 73 A.L.R.4TH 782,
§ 2(b) (1989) (discussing how training impacts duty to report); 49 U.S.C. § 44918
(discussing some training made available to airline crewmembers).
162 Marrus, supra note 156, at 514.
163 See Experts Explain Why Sexual Assaults Occur On Airplanes & What Airlines Can
Do to Stop It, supra note 159 (noting in-flight sexual assault “is a crime that is not
obvious” and conditions on planes make it more likely to occur).
694 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
the chances of preserving evidence and responding to the
crimes effectively.164
C. HAZARDOUS WASTE REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Reporting requirements in environmental law present other
parallels to the commercial airline context outside of demon-
strating a passenger’s vulnerability. The Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA),165 which was later reinforced by the Emergency
Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act (EPCRA),166 re-
quires that if hazardous waste is released without permission in
certain circumstances, it must be immediately reported to the
U.S. government, state, local, or tribal officials.167 One reason
this requirement was created is so that the government could
appropriately respond to the situation by investigating, organiz-
ing a cleanup, and evacuating citizens.168 Another reason was to
record inactive hazardous waste sites.169 Essentially, this means
that the reporting requirement “also contains record keeping
requirements that enable the government to track potential
threats to the environment.”170
Under CERCLA and EPCRA, the one required to report the
impermissible release of hazardous waste is the “person in
charge” of the vessel or facility from which the waste was re-
leased.171 In other words, the one responsible for reporting is
the one entrusted with the care of the facility or vessel.172 The
purpose of environmental reporting requirements supports the
idea that the general public needs protection from dangerous
events beyond their control.173
164 See Scott McFarlane, Surge in Sexual Assaults on Airplanes, NBC (June 12,
2015),  https://www.nbcwashington.com/news/local/surge-in-sexual-assaults-on-
airplanes/1982641/ [https://perma.cc/WFJ7-4PGS] (“Investigations [of in-flight
sexual assault], though still possible, become more complicated after attackers
and witnesses have left the scene.”).
165 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 9601–9675.
166 Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 11001–11050.
167 See 42 U.S.C. § 9603(a); Thompson, supra note 116, at 31–32.
168 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 34.
169 Id. at 33.
170 Id.
171 42 U.S.C. §§ 9603(a), 11004(a).
172 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 33.
173 See id. at 34.
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Just as reporting hazardous waste is necessary for the govern-
ment to appropriately respond to the situation,174 airline mem-
bers need to report the instances of in-flight sexual assault so
that law enforcement may properly respond to the situation.175
If the commercial airline does not report the incident to law
enforcement when they are notified, the perpetrator may get
away.176 The fact that passengers come from around the world
may further complicate this.177 If assailants are not stopped as
soon as the plane lands, they may retreat to a location outside
the reach of U.S. law enforcement or far enough away that law
enforcement lacks the resources to pursue an effective investiga-
tion.178 Further, if airline crewmembers do not report the inci-
dent to law enforcement immediately, important details that
were known at the time of the attack may be forgotten or wit-
nesses to the incident may be unavailable.179 The assailant may
even be allowed to fly on the same airline again.180 All of this
174 See id.
175 See supra Parts II, IV.
176 E.g., Complaint for Damages at 5, Dvaladze v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., No.
2:18-cv-00297-RSL (W.D. Wash. July 25, 2019), ECF No. 1; see also Stephen Stock,
Mark Villarreal & Kevin Nious, Chaos on Commercial Flights: Unruly Airline Passen-
gers Rarely Face Criminal Charges, NBC (Dec. 16, 2015, 2:04 PM), https://www.
nbcbayarea.com/news/local/unruly-passengers-escape-prosecution/143956/
[https://perma.cc/RXA9-QMHS] (noting that, similar to the lack of reporting
requirements for in-flight sexual assault, airlines are not required to report un-
ruly passengers—even if they must be detained mid-flight—and these passengers
are often allowed to go free without facing any repercussions).
177 Air Passenger Travel Arrivals in the United States from Selected Foreign Countries,
BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATS., https://www.bts.gov/content/air-passenger-travel-ar-
rivals-united-states-selected-foreign-countries-thousands-passenger [https://
perma.cc/SV5G-CF7D].
178 Brad Heath, The Ones That Get Away, USA TODAY (Oct. 21, 2014), https://
www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2014/03/11/fugitives-next-door/
6262719/ [https://perma.cc/VFU6-HEHS] (describing legal difficulties associ-
ated with securing justice once fugitives cross state lines); William Magnuson, The
Domestic Politics of International Extradition, 52 VA. J. INT’L L. 839, 897 (2012)
(describing uncertainty regarding what counts as compliance with international
extradition treaties).
179 See, e.g., McFarlane, supra note 164 (describing incident where passenger
notified law enforcement of an in-flight assault after landing, but charges could
not be brought because “other passengers and potential witnesses had already
dispersed”).
180 See Rheana Murray, The Consequences of Being an Unruly Plane Passenger, ABC
NEWS (Sept. 4, 2014, 1:28 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/US/consequences-un-
ruly-plane-passenger/story?id=25246721 [https://perma.cc/G6R8-HHXY] (re-
porting on American Airlines spokesperson Josh Freed’s statement that while
denying a passenger future travel aboard an airline is possible, it “rarely
happens”).
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suggests that the airline should be required to report as soon as
practicably possible. Just as a hazardous waste facility failing to
report an incident may subject others to harm such as pollution
or sickness, an airline failing to report sexual assault could cre-
ate future victims.181 While this sort of crime does not affect the
general public in the same way hazardous waste might,182 the
benefit of requiring reporting—potentially protecting others
from being victimized—arguably outweighs the cost of intrud-
ing on airline company policy with mandating reporting
requirements.
Further, while a commercial airline would not necessarily be
responsible for the in-flight assault in the way the one in charge
of the vessel or facility leaking hazardous waste might,183 they
are still entrusted with the care of their passengers. Courts have
demonstrated this by repeatedly stating that airlines can be held
liable for passenger-on-passenger assault.184 Requiring airline
crewmembers to report in-flight crime makes sense, as they have
more control over the vessel than their passengers and a respon-
sibility to care for those onboard.185 Lastly, as the FBI has stated,
data on sexual assault aboard planes is likely incorrect.186 Just as
the CERCLA reporting requirement also functions to aid the
development of a central database containing violations,187 re-
quiring airline crewmembers to report in-flight sexual assault
could aid law enforcement agencies in collecting and maintain-
ing more accurate data. In the age of technology, data is being
used around the world to predict where crime is most likely to
181 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 34.
182 E.g., Isabelle Chapman, A Landfill in Their Backyard, CNN (Sept. 11, 2020),
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2020/09/us/september-11-cancer-rates-fresh-
kills/ [https://perma.cc/5K88-WF9L] (describing liability to third parties for im-
pacts of hazardous waste).
183 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 33 (discussing how those required to re-
port hazardous waste releases are the ones responsible for it because they oversee
the facility or vessel).
184 See DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 6–20.
185 See Louis Cheslaw, What Happens When a Law is Broken on a Plane, CONDÉ
NAST TRAVELER (July 8, 2019), https://www.cntraveler.com/story/what-happens-
when-a-law-is-broken-on-a-plane [https://perma.cc/W5QL-QXEH]. When situa-
tions occur within the cabin, the flight crew is the group that responds. Id. Pilots,
who respond to reports from other crewmembers onboard, “are also the ones in
charge of reporting any incidents to air traffic control below”—it is this report
that leads “to a police presence at the gate once the plane lands.” Id.
186 See Sexual Assault Aboard Aircraft, supra note 7 (mentioning how in-flight sex-
ual assault is underreported).
187 Thompson, supra note 116, at 33.
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occur.188 Law enforcement uses this information and deploys ad-
ditional resources to deter crime where the patterns indicate it
is likely to return.189 If accurate data were collected regarding in-
flight sexual assault, police could potentially review this informa-
tion and deduce which flights are most likely to have attacks,
which airlines need to increase safety procedures, and if other
circumstances increase risk for an airline or passenger.190
Child abuse and environmental violations are very different
types of crimes. Crimes on cruise ships can take a variety of
forms. Child abuse generally affects one person and a broad
range of individuals may be required to report it.191 Environ-
mental violations may affect a larger portion of the public and
require only a few specified individuals to report them.192
Crimes on cruise ships generally affect one individual at a time
and restrict who is required to report.193 Yet, the purposes and
policies behind all of these varied, large-scale reporting require-
ments extend to the mandated reporting of in-flight sexual as-
sault. Congress should instill a reporting requirement to better
protect and respond to victims, prevent future attacks, decrease
incentives for airlines to cover up crimes, assist law enforcement,
and collect accurate data. Still, the best solution is not to allow
an airline to report however they choose. Instead, a uniform re-
porting requirement should be enacted, as it is the most benefi-
cial for the victims, the judicial system, and the airlines.
188 Andrej Kovacevic, Police are Using Big Data to Predict Future Crime Rates, SMART
DATA COLLECTIVE (Nov. 7, 2018), https://www.smartdatacollective.com/police-
are-using-big-data-to-predict-future-crime-rates/ [perma.cc/6AAS-8X98].
189 JENNIFER BACHNER, PREDICTIVE POLICING: PREVENTING CRIME WITH DATA AND
ANALYTICS 8–9 (2013), http://www.businessofgovernment.org/sites/default/files
/Predictive%20Policing.pdf [https://perma.cc/68UQ-F46K].
190 For more information on data-driven policing and how law enforcement
uses the data it receives, see id.; WALTER L. PERRY, BRIAN MCINNIS, CARTER C.
PRICE, SUSAN C. SMITH & JOHN S. HOLLYWOOD, PREDICTIVE POLICING (2013),
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/243830.pdf [https://perma.cc/
9CE7-4AT6]; Lawrence W. Sherman, Wolfson Prof. of Criminology and Dir. of
Police Exec. Programme, Cambridge Univ., Knowledge-Based Policing: India and the
Global Revolution in Crime Prevention (Apr. 8, 2010), in JINDAL GLOB. L. REV. 1,
Sept. 2010, at *1.
191 See supra Section V.B.
192 See Thompson, supra note 116, at 33–34; see also supra Section V.C.
193 See supra Section V.A.
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VI. THE BENEFITS OF A UNIFORM REPORTING
REQUIREMENT
While the above Parts of this Comment have addressed some
of the general benefits of a reporting requirement, the remain-
der of this Part will discuss the benefits of a uniform reporting
requirement specifically. Unlike child abuse reporting require-
ments where each state has their own procedures and rules,194
the federal government could enact a reporting requirement for
in-flight sexual assault that would extend to all domestic com-
mercial airlines regardless of jurisdiction.195 As the federal gov-
ernment likely has the authority to enact such a requirement, it
should do so, particularly in light of the benefits that come with
a uniform reporting requirement.196
Air carriers can be liable for sexual assaults that occur in-flight
even if it is a passenger-on-passenger assault.197 As a common
carrier’s liability often turns on whether the incident was fore-
seeable or whether the vessel had a heightened duty of care,
airlines are likely to decrease their chances of liability by adher-
ing to a uniform reporting requirement that has been put in
place.198 For example, if a victim reports an in-flight assault, the
crime is not reported, and the assailant escapes, the airline
could be considered negligent in their treatment of the victim if
the court finds they owe the victim a duty of care.199 This is a
likely result under common carrier doctrine.
On the other hand, if the federal government enacts a uni-
form reporting requirement with specific measures to be taken
and procedures to be followed, airlines will have clearer guide-
lines as to how they should respond. With clarity in guidance,
airlines will better understand what they should do, which in
turn helps them understand their risks for liability. This clarity
would also increase judicial efficiency, as there would be less
case-by-case analysis (at least insofar as whether the airline
194 See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 148, at 37–38.
195 See Federal Aviation Administration, supra note 59; Mission, supra note 63.
196 Supra Section III.B.
197 See, e.g., Wallace v. Korean Air, 214 F.3d 293, 295 (2d Cir. 2000); Langadi-
nos v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 199 F.3d 68, 74 (1st Cir. 2000); Tsevas v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., No. 97C0320, 1997 WL 767278, at *16 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 1, 1997).
198 See DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 13 (discussing common carrier liability).
199 Cf. R.M. v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 338 F. Supp. 3d 1203, 1206–07 (D. Or. 2018)
(finding airline not liable when (1) the defendant was not intoxicated; (2) the
attack was noticed by a flight attendant; (3) the passengers were separated; (4)
law enforcement was notified immediately; and (5) law enforcement met the as-
sailant upon landing).
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should have reported), and the court may instead look to see
whether they adhered to the uniform requirement. Yet, as
House Bill 5139 suggests, adherence or failure to abide by a re-
porting requirement should not be dispositive in a court pro-
ceeding; it should be looked at as a factor to determine the
airline’s liability.200 The court should still account for possible
extenuating circumstances.
Additionally, as it currently stands, reporting requirements
are dictated by the airlines themselves. While some companies,
such as Alaska Airlines, have been praised for their recently en-
acted policies,201 others have yet to respond to the increase in
mid-air assaults.202 If a mandatory, uniform reporting require-
ment was enacted, the airlines who have yet to respond to the
increasing issue of in-flight sexual assault would be pushed to
action. This could help keep passengers safer, shield airlines
from liability, and encourage the airlines to enact other policies
relating to in-flight sexual assaults. These policies could include
additional training for the flight crew, guidance on how to treat
a victim of an alleged assault, and regulations concerning when
a passenger should be removed or forbidden from future flights
with the airline.203 By making the reporting requirement uni-
form, airlines will no longer dictate when to report. Uncertainty
will be eliminated, and airlines do not have to hope their com-
pany reporting policies are sufficient to protect themselves from
liability. It will also be more difficult for airlines to find loop-
holes in the hopes of shielding themselves from legal responsi-
bility. Further, crewmembers will have to be trained on in-flight
sexual assault—at least to the extent that they will have to be
coached on when to report. A uniform reporting requirement
ensures passengers can choose any airline and not have to worry
200 Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. § 41727(d) (1st Sess. 2019).
201 Allison Dvaladze, Airline Industry Treats Sexual Assaults in the Skies Like an
Inconvenience, Not a Crime, USA TODAY (Apr. 1, 2019), https://usatoday.com/
story/opinion/voices/2019/04/01/sexual-assault-airline-flight-elaine-chao-
trump-boeing-column/3312204002/ [perma.cc/8F5F-Z26R] (applauding Alaska
Airlines for their policies regarding in-flight assault).
202 Kirk Johnson, 2 Airline Sexual Assault Cases Draw Charges and a Call for Help,
N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 30, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/30/us/airplane-
assault-seattle.html [perma.cc/9733-TRE7] (“[M]any other airlines have been
silent.”).
203 See Making Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Miscon-
duct, supra note 111 (discussing Alaska Airlines’ new reporting and training
policies).
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about an incident of in-flight sexual assault going unreported
when it occurs.204
A uniform reporting requirement does take away some of the
airlines’ autonomy and may require a price increase to instill the
reporting procedures. For example, Alaska Airlines, currently at
the forefront of airlines advocating for increased safety for pas-
sengers, has created a “24/7 hotline” and reporting tool.205 This
tool, called Report It!, is a safety app “installed on every com-
pany-issued mobile device” which allows crewmembers “to in-
stantly report any allegation of harassment or assault, and flag it
for investigation.”206 Despite the likely cost associated with build-
ing a new application,207 Alaska Airlines found that it was a
worthwhile price to pay to ensure passenger safety, assist in law
enforcement investigations, and shield themselves from liabil-
ity.208 Further, existing FAA regulations could be said to impede
airline autonomy and cost airlines a substantial amount of
money.209 As these regulations were passed, and many of them
relate to passenger safety, it follows that airlines and Congress
should be open to a mandated reporting requirement.
VII. CONCLUSION
“For the women, men and children sexually assaulted while
flying who have demanded action, as well as those who suffer in
silence, the DOT must do more. . . . Sexual assault can no
longer be treated as an inconvenience, it is a crime and must be
treated as such.”210 As in-flight sexual assault victim Allison
Dvaladze stated, the aviation industry can and needs to do more.
The current lack of a reporting requirement for in-flight sexual
assault prevents effective investigations by law enforcement and
204 Admittedly, this is something the normal passenger is unlikely to think
about when choosing an airline; however, it could play a bigger role in the future
as in-flight sexual assaults become more publicized. See supra Part II.
205 Making Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Misconduct,
supra note 111.
206 Id.
207 While specific numbers for the cost to Alaska Airlines are unavailable, the
cost of developing applications, such as the one Alaska Airlines employs, can
range from $40,000 (simple apps) to $100,000 (complex apps). Kim Smith, How
Much Does It Cost to Create an App?, GOODFIRMS, https://www.goodfirms.co/re-
sources/mobile-app-development-cost [https://perma.cc/T6C6-ZDVU].
208 See Making Respect Real: Continued Work to Prevent and Address Sexual Miscon-
duct, supra note 111.
209 See Aeronautics and Space, 14 C.F.R. §§ 1–1399 (2019) (consisting of all
current FAA regulations).
210 Dvaladze, supra note 201.
2020] ACCOUNTABILITY FOR SEXUAL ASSAULTS 701
impedes justice for victims while allowing airlines to conceal
crimes and escape liability.
The airline industry should follow the lead of the cruise ship
industry and impose a uniform, mandatory reporting require-
ment such as the CVSSA.211 While the CVSSA is not perfect and
a similar reporting requirement alone will not be a solution to
the issue of in-flight assault, the first step in finding solutions is
knowing there is a problem.212 A uniform, mandatory reporting
law would inform the public and the airlines that Congress takes
the safety of its traveling citizens seriously. It alerts airlines to the
fact that they will be held accountable for the care of their pas-
sengers, promoting safety and better responses to sexual assault.
House Bill 5139 is a necessary first step to establishing
mandatory reporting for airlines. House Bill 5139 should, and
likely will, be passed into law,213 but its vague wording and the
discretion it leaves to the airline industry poses a potential for
airlines to continue to avoid responsibility.214 Congress should
revise House Bill 5139 to make it specific and uniform. Further,
Congress should continue to support the Task Force, so that the
trend of recognizing and preventing sexual assault in all scena-
rios can be maintained.215
211 See 46 U.S.C. § 3507.
212 For more information on the CVSSA and some of its initial shortcomings,
see Peyroux, supra note 121, at 103–17.
213 See Brown & Gallagher, supra note 148, at 39–40 (noting how media atten-
tion was part of the basis for enacting CAPTA). If the trend of media attention on
abuse continues, House Bill 5139 likely will be passed. See supra Part II.
214 See Stop Sexual Assault and Harassment in Transportation Act, H.R. 5139,
116th Cong. § 41727(b)(3) (1st Sess. 2019); see also Peyroux, supra note 121, at
117 (discussing vagueness as one shortcoming of the CVSSA).
215 DeMay et al., supra note 31, at 3–5 (describing composition and purpose of
the Task Force); see also Section III.C.1.
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The over-delegation by the Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA) of new aircraft design certification authority to the very
companies seeking such certification has led to a stunning lack
of oversight and bending to private economic interests. Con-
gressional action must be taken to ensure that aircraft certifica-
tion authority, if delegated to private entities, is not delegated to
any entities with ties to the companies seeking certification, and
FAA oversight must be tightened.
This Comment analyzes whether the Federal Tort Claims Act
could provide a potential avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the
FAA as it relates to its oversight and delegation to The Boeing
Company (Boeing). In the face of inaction from the FAA, Boe-
ing, and Congress, the judiciary provides the best hope for hold-
ing the FAA accountable when it delegates authority to private
industry leaders like Boeing. It is likely well within the FAA’s
discretion to determine that the engineers at Boeing to whom
Boeing would assign to this task are qualified in their engineer-
ing capabilities. However, if the FAA knew that economic pres-
sures and factors outside of plane safety were guiding Boeing
executives’ directions to its inspecting engineers, it may have
delegated its certification authority to unqualified individuals,
which it cannot do.
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my first-year legal writing professor, Heather Stobaugh, for teaching me how to
be a competent writer.
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I. INTRODUCTION
THE U.S. GOVERNMENT’S over-delegation of new aircraftdesign certification authority to the very companies seeking
such certification has led to a stunning lack of oversight and
bending to private economic interests. Congressional action
must be taken to ensure that aircraft certification authority, if
delegated to private entities, is not delegated to any entities with
ties to the companies seeking certification, and Federal Aviation
Administration (FAA) oversight must be tightened.
This Comment begins by describing the background of the
Boeing 737 (737) aircraft and the recent 737 MAX accidents.
The serious consequences of those crashes are explored, and
the scope of the problem is put into perspective. The Comment
then explains the relevant historical background of the FAA and
the designation program, establishes the framework within
which recent issues faced by The Boeing Company (Boeing) re-
side, and discusses how the delegation program came to be and
how the FAA designates private parties as Organization Designa-
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tion Authority (ODA) holders (ODA Holders). Next, it analyzes
the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) and how the Supreme
Court has interpreted the discretionary function exception to
the FTCA.
This Comment then assesses whether the FTCA could provide
a potential avenue for plaintiffs to challenge the FAA’s over-del-
egation of certification authority to Boeing. While this route was
not historically open to plaintiffs, by delegating certain aspects
of the safety inspection process to Boeing and failing to main-
tain oversight, the FAA’s actions have moved outside the protec-
tion of the discretionary function exception, allowing suits
against the FAA by injured plaintiffs. This Comment concludes
by discussing why litigation is the best way to spur meaningful
reform.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
A. THE 737 MAX AND COMPETITION WITH AIRBUS
The Boeing 737 is one of the most widely recognizable passen-
ger aircraft in the world. Since its first flight in 1967, the 737 has
undergone a series of enhancements, culminating most recently
with the 737 Next Generation (737NG) and the 737 MAX.1
These upgrades were designed to provide more fuel-efficient en-
gines, updated avionics and cabins, and lower operating costs,
all while having enough in common with previous models that
pilots could easily switch back and forth between them.2 In
2006, Boeing began discussions to significantly upgrade or re-
place the 737NG with a new, more fuel efficient model.3 By
2010, Boeing still had not made a decision when one of its chief
rivals in the industry, Airbus SE (Airbus), announced the
A320neo, “a re-engined, more efficient version of its A320, the
main competitor to the 737.”4 These two industry titans have
been in competition for almost half a century, and many have
wondered whether the tradeoffs being made in the interest of
1 David Slotnick, The First Boeing 737 Max Crash was 2 Years Ago Today. Here’s the
Complete History of the Plane That’s Been Grounded Since 2 Crashes Killed 346 People 5





4 Id. Neo stands for new engine option.
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competition were dangerous.5 In 2011, Boeing’s then-CEO
feared that American Airlines, one of Boeing’s exclusive custom-
ers, would switch to Airbus unless Boeing could convince them
otherwise.6 Boeing decided to upgrade the engines on the 737
and build a new plane, launching Boeing’s effort to circumvent
important regulatory hurdles.7 American Airlines wound up
purchasing from Airbus, but also ordered 100 next generation
737s from Boeing, and “[j]ust one month later, Boeing an-
nounced the 737 MAX family,” the newest iteration of the 737.8
A key selling point of the 737 MAX was its purported similarity
with older models, which would make it easier for pilots and
staff to adjust to without much additional training.9 Signifi-
cantly, and likely most important to Boeing executives, this pro-
vided a faster route to certification than what would be
necessary for a brand new type of aircraft.10 One of the key dif-
ferences in the new plane was that the engines were larger, fur-
ther forward, and higher up than the previous version.11 This
upgrade could cause the nose of the plane to pitch slightly up-
ward in some situations, leading engineers to implement auto-
mated software called Maneuvering Control Augmentation
System (MCAS), which would automatically push the nose down
so that the plane stays level.12 Though theoretically the pilots
could fly both the old and new planes, “Boeing did not include
training on MCAS in the pilots’ manual, reasoning that the
software would work in the background.”13 “MCAS was designed
to take effect when a single sensor showed that the ‘angle-of at-
tack’ was high,” meaning the system would still respond if one of
the two sensors broke.14 Issues surrounding this system would
5 Peter Cohan, Did Airbus Rivalry Drive Dangerous Tradeoffs for Boeing’s 737
MAX?, FORBES (Mar. 28, 2019, 9:14 AM), https://forbes.com/sites/petercohan/
2019/03/28/did-airbus-rivalry-drive-dangerous-tradeoffs-for-boeings-737-max/
[perma.cc/BU8H-9JSV].
6 Slotnick, supra note 1.
7 Cohan, supra note 5; David Gelles, Natalie Kitroeff, Jack Nicas & Rebecca R.
Ruiz, Boeing Was ‘Go, Go, Go’ to Beat Airbus With The 737 Max, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 23,
2019), https://nytimes.com/2019/03/23/business/boeing-737-max-crash.html
[perma.cc/N25Z-EHAJ].




12 Cohan, supra note 5; Slotnick, supra note 1.
13 Slotnick, supra note 1.
14 Id.
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later prove catastrophic.15 In 2015, the first 737 MAX was re-
leased, with its first test flight in 2016.16 It gained certification
from the FAA in 2017.17 “By May 2018 . . . more than 130 [737
MAX] planes were in service with 28 different airlines around
the world.”18
B. THE LION AIR AND ETHIOPIAN AIRLINES CRASHES
On October 29, 2018, Lion Air Flight 610 took off from
Jakarta, Indonesia in the early hours of the morning.19 The
plane had given incorrect speed and altitude readings during a
previous flight but was kept in service.20 Immediately after take-
off, the pilots received stall warnings; their instruments were not
giving readings on key data, and it seemed the plane was auto-
matically being forced into a downward pitch.21 Twelve minutes
later, the plane crashed into the sea, killing all 189 on board.22
Shortly after the investigation began, MCAS and the pilots’ re-
sponse became a focus, and the FAA and Boeing said they
planned to issue an Airworthiness Directive on issues related to
the system.23
Less than five months later, a disturbingly similar scene
played out in Ethiopia, when an Ethiopian Airlines flight
crashed, killing everyone on board.24 Once again, pilots of a 737
MAX were unable to control the pitch of the aircraft, and MCAS
forced the nose down and crashed the plane.25 Shortly after the
crash, although it was clear MCAS played a role, investigators
were unsure how much fault lay with the pilots.26 However, a
year later, investigators determined that MCAS was entirely at
15 See infra Section II.B.








24 Tucker Reals, Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302 Crash; Preliminary Report Says Pilots
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fault, shining an even more negative light on the aircraft itself
and on Boeing.27
Ethiopian Airlines grounded the rest of its 737 MAX fleet the
day of the crash.28 The rest of the world followed suit, and soon
the highly publicized global grounding of the plane was in full
force.29 However, the FAA was the last to do so.30 Boeing initially
thought it could get the software issue fixed and the planes back
up and running by the end of March 2019.31 But due to delays
with the software updates, the FAA only cleared the 737 MAX
aircraft to fly again in late 2020.32
C. FALLOUT
The fallout from the crashes continues to grow, touching all
aspects of government (particularly the FAA), the airline indus-
try, and Boeing. The FAA continued to scrutinize the plane fol-
lowing delays in a potential fix, which led to the entire
certification process coming under scrutiny.33 Boeing has had to
cut production of the 737 MAX, suffering significant losses.34
“[It] is in talks with banks to secure a loan of $10 billion or more
. . . as the company faces rising costs stemming from two fatal
crashes of its 737 MAX planes.”35 Recently, Boeing announced
that further delays are expected after the recent disclosure of a
software issue.36 These delays will continue to drive up costs as
customers seek compensation for undelivered planes.37 Airbus
has now surpassed Boeing as the world’s largest aircraft manu-
27 Simon Marks & Abdi Latif Dahir, Ethiopian Report on 737 Max Crash Blames
Boeing, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 9, 2020), https://nytimes.com/2020/03/09/world/af-
rica/ethiopia-crash-boeing.html [perma.cc/Z4GM-PSUR].
28 Slotnick, supra note 1.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 Slotnick, supra note 1; American Airlines Plans to Return Boeing 737 Max to
Service at Year-End, REUTERS (Oct. 18, 2020), https://reuters.com/article/us-boe-
ing-737max-american-airline/american-air-to-run-boeing-737-max-at-year-end-
bloomberg-news-idUSKBN27305O [perma.cc/A2KT-BLYR].
32 Niraj Chokshi, Boeing 737 Max Is Cleared by F.A.A. to Fly Again, N.Y. TIMES
(Nov. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/18/business/boeing-737-
max-faa.html [perma.cc/WZR5-KJSC].
33 Slotnick, supra note 1.
34 Leslie Josephs, Boeing Is in Talks to Borrow $10 Billion or More as 737 Max Crisis
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facturer, and Boeing’s credit rating has been placed under
review.38
Congress has gotten involved and launched investigations
into Boeing, the FAA, and the relationship between the two.
Dennis Muilenburg, former Boeing CEO, testified before Con-
gress in October 2019 and was subject to intense questioning.39
In December 2019, Boeing fired Muilenburg for his handling of
the 737 MAX crises.40 During the congressional investigation,
FAA administrator Steve Dickson gave a shocking piece of testi-
mony: “After the first crash, an internal FAA analysis showed a
high likelihood of future crashes, as many as 15 over the 30–40
year life of the jet. However, the FAA let the plane keep
flying.”41
The FAA commissioned the Joint Authorities Technical Re-
view (JATR), consisting of technical experts from the FAA, Na-
tional Aeronautics & Space Administration, European Union
Aviation Safety Agency, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Indo-
nesia, Japan, Singapore, and the United Arab Emirates.42 The
review documented observations, findings, and a series of rec-
ommendations for actions that could be taken to help prevent
similar tragedies from occurring.43
III. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
A. BRIEF HISTORY OF THE FAA
In 1926, at the urging of aviation industry leaders, and in an
effort to help air travel reach its full commercial potential, the
Air Commerce Act was passed.44 Under this initial version of
what would later become the Federal Aviation Act, the Secretary
of Commerce was charged with “fostering air commerce, issuing
and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots, certifying air-
craft, establishing airways, and operating and maintaining aids
38 Id.
39 Slotnick, supra note 1.
40 Josephs, supra note 34.
41 Slotnick, supra note 1.
42 The Joint Authorities Technical Review (JATR) – Boeing 737 MAX Flight Control




44 A Brief History of the FAA, FED. AVIATION ADMIN. (Jan. 4, 2017, 4:42 PM),
https://www.faa.gov/about/history/brief_history/ [perma.cc/ZN5M-N7BR]; Air
Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
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to air navigation.”45 One of the first tasks of the new Bureau of
Air Commerce centered on air traffic control.46 But by the early
1930s, the Department of Commerce’s oversight responsibilities
were already being called into question following crashes that
killed a prominent football coach and a U.S. Senator.47 To en-
sure a focus on safety, President Franklin Roosevelt signed the
Civil Aeronautics Act in 1938, establishing the Civil Aeronautics
Authority (CAA) to conduct investigations into aviation acci-
dents and provide recommendations to prevent future acci-
dents.48 Just before the United States’ entry into World War II,
the CAA took full control over air traffic control towers, making
air traffic control a permanent federal responsibility.49 However,
in 1956, a midair collision killed 128 people and highlighted the
need for even greater oversight and safety control of national
airspace.50
In 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was passed, transferring the
CAA function to the new independent Federal Aviation
Agency.51 Feeling a need for a coordinated transportation sys-
tem among all modes of transportation, Congress authorized
the creation of the Department of Transportation in 1966 and
1967.52 The Federal Aviation Agency became known as the FAA,
and oversight of the FAA soon transitioned to the Department
of Transportation.53 However, the new agency was not just
tasked with safety, but also with fostering air commerce.54 As one
commenter has noted, “This additional imperative has had a
profound impact on the development of the FAA and its admin-
istrative functions over the past four decades.”55 Thus, from the
beginning, the FAA has had to balance airline safety against
commercial success in the airline industry—two positions that
will inevitably conflict from time to time.56 Concerns over this
45 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
46 Id.
47 Id.
48 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 1131.
49 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
50 Id.
51 Id.; Federal Aviation Act, Pub. L. No. 85-726, 72 Stat. 731 (1958).
52 A Brief History of the FAA, supra note 44.
53 Id.
54 Federal Aviation Act, pmbl.
55 Mark C. Niles, On the Hijacking of Agencies (And Airplanes): The Federal Aviation
Administration, “Agency Capture,” and Airline Security, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 381, 407 (2002).
56 Id.
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“dual mandate” led to statutory amendments removing the “pro-
moting” language and focusing more on safety.57 Nonetheless,
“[o]ne salient apparent consequence of the FAA’s dual mandate
has been its extensive reliance on the private entities it
regulates.”58
B. THE ORGANIZATION DESIGNATION AUTHORITY: DELEGATION
OF CERTIFICATION AUTHORITY TO PRIVATE ENTITIES
Part of the legislation directing the Secretary of Transporta-
tion to promote safety in the airline industry granted the Secre-
tary the discretion to “prescribe reasonable rules and
regulations” governing aircraft inspection, including how the in-
spections would be accomplished.59 Congress, however, empha-
sized that air carriers themselves “retained certain
responsibilities to promote the public interest in air safety.”60
Congress established a certification process to monitor and con-
trol how the airline industry complied with the regulations.61 At
each step in this process, FAA employees inspect materials sub-
mitted by aircraft manufacturers for compliance, then issue the
appropriate certificate to allow the manufacturers to produce
and market their products.62
Step one in this process is known as type certification.63 This
involves obtaining FAA approval of the plane’s basic design.64
“By regulation, the FAA has made the applicant itself responsi-
ble for conducting all inspections and tests necessary to deter-
mine that the aircraft comports with FAA airworthiness
requirements.”65 During this process, a prototype of the new
57 Id. at 408.
58 Id. at 413.
59 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 804 (1984).
60 Id.
61 Id.
62 Id. at 805.
63 Id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.11–.55 (2020).
64 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805.
65 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.33, 21.35).
Each applicant must make all inspections and tests necessary to
determine
(1) Compliance with the applicable airworthiness, aircraft noise,
fuel venting, and exhaust emission requirements;
(2) That materials and products conform to the specifications in
the type design;
(3) That parts of the products conform to the drawings in the
type design; and
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plane is developed, and ground and flight tests are conducted.66
The FAA then reviews all the submitted data and, if it finds the
proposed design meets the minimum safety standards, it ap-
proves the design and issues a type certificate.67 However, pro-
duction still cannot begin.68 Before production, a company must
obtain a production certificate allowing it to produce copies of
the prototype for commercial use.69 “To obtain a production
certificate, the manufacturer must prove to the FAA that it has
established and can maintain a quality control system to assure
that each aircraft will meet the design provision of the type cer-
tificate.”70 While this certificate allows the manufacturer to mass
produce the new aircraft, it still cannot be put into service.71
First, the FAA must grant an airworthiness certificate, essentially
assuring the particular plane is safe for flying.72
When an aircraft manufacturer like Boeing wants to upgrade
its planes and introduce a major change in its design, yet an-
other certificate is required: a supplemental type certificate.73
If a person holds the [type certificate] for a product and alters
that product by introducing a major change in type design that
does not require an application for a new [type certificate] under
§ 21.19, that person must apply to the FAA either for an STC, or
to amend the original type certificate under subpart D of this
part.74
To obtain this supplemental type certificate, the altered aircraft
must meet its airworthiness requirements.75 Similar to the prior
steps, the applicant must conduct the required inspections and
tests to ensure its product complies with regulations.76 However,
this is no small task. The FAA has a limited number of engineers
(4) That the manufacturing processes, construction and assem-
bly conform to those specified in the type design.
14 C.F.R. § 21.33(b).
66 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805–06.
67 Id. at 806.
68 Id.
69 Id.; 14 C.F.R. §§ 21.131–.150.
70 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 806.
71 Id.
72 Id.; 14 C.F.R. § 21.183.
73 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 806 (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.113).
74 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.113).
75 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 21.115(a)).
76 Id.
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and employees.77 “[R]oughly 700 individuals are responsible for
ALL design approvals, production & continued airworthiness of
everything that flies and of that, maybe 400 are engineers.”78 In
contrast, private companies like Boeing employ thousands of
employees. “According to the Boeing website, it has over 45,000
engineers spread throughout the entire company. [With s]uch a
deep roster of talent, [Boeing] has incredibly deep and specific
expertise for new designs and to manage the safety and airwor-
thiness of the nearly 14,000 Boeing airplanes flying today.”79
In response to the FAA’s limited resources, Congress has au-
thorized the FAA to delegate some of its testing authority.80 The
FAA “may delegate to a qualified private person, or to an em-
ployee under the supervision of that person, a matter related to
(A) the examination, testing, and inspection necessary to issue a
certificate under this chapter; and (B) issuing the certificate.”81
Based on this provision, the FAA created the ODA program to
delegate to private organizations its authority to inspect aircraft
designs and issue certificates.82 “An FAA Designation ‘allows an
organization to perform specified functions on behalf of the Ad-
ministrator related to engineering, manufacturing, operations,
airworthiness, or maintenance.’”83 This ODA system is designed
to be a system of direct oversight.
Generally, to be considered as an ODA, an applicant must:
(1) Have sufficient facilities, resources, and personnel, to per-
form the functions for which authorization is requested;
(2) Have sufficient experience with FAA requirements,
processes, and procedures to perform the functions for
which authorization is requested; and
(3) Have sufficient, relevant experience to perform the func-
tions for which authorization is requested.84
According to federal regulations:
The ODA Holder must—
77 Mike Borfitz, What FAA Delegation Does—How and Why?, AVIATION TECH.





81 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d)(1).
82 Riggs v. Airbus Helicopters, Inc., 939 F.3d 981, 984 (9th Cir. 2019).
83 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. § 183.41(a) (2020)).
84 14 C.F.R. § 183.47.
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(a) Comply with the procedures contained in its approved
procedures manual;
(b) Give ODA Unit members sufficient authority to perform
the authorized functions;
(c) Ensure that no conflicting non-ODA Unit duties or other
interreference affects the performance of authorized func-
tions by ODA Unit members;
(d) Cooperate with the [FAA] Administrator in his perform-
ance of oversight of the ODA Holder and the ODA Unit;
(e) Notify the [FAA] Administrator of any change that could
affect the ODA Holder’s ability to continue to meet the
requirements of this part within 48 hours of the change
occurring.85
Though its origins date back to the 1950s, the ODA program
itself began in 2005 and was not fully implemented until 2009.86
This system relies heavily on the integrity and transparency of
the ODA holder and strict, careful oversight by the FAA.
C. THE FTCA AND THE FAA
In 1946, Congress enacted the Federal Tort Claims Act
(FTCA) as part of the Legislative Reorganization Act.87 The
FTCA authorizes suits against the United States for damages:
[F]or injury or loss of property, or personal injury or death
caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any em-
ployee of the Government while acting within the scope of his
office or employment, under circumstances where the United
States, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant in ac-
cordance with the law of the place where the act or omission
occurred.88
However, there are exceptions; the FTCA does not waive federal
sovereign immunity in all respects.89 In particular, under the dis-
cretionary function exemption,90 the FTCA does not apply to
[a]ny claim based upon an act or omission of an employee of the
Government, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute or
regulation, whether or not such state or regulation be valid, or
85 Id. § 183.57.
86 Roncevert Ganan Almond, After the Max: Rebuilding U.S. Aviation Leadership,
60 VA. J. INT’L L. ONLINE 1, 14 (2019).
87 David S. Fishback & Gail Killefer, The Discretionary Function Exception to the
Federal Tort Claims Act: Dalehite to Varig to Berkovitz, 25 IDAHO L. REV. 291, 293
(1989).
88 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b).
89 Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 293.
90 Id. at 294.
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based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exer-
cise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of a
federal agency or an employee of the Government, whether or
not the discretion involved be abused.91
The scope of the discretionary function exemption has been an
area of dispute since the passage of the FTCA.92 “On the one
hand, some saw the exception as standing for the simple pro-
position that the FTCA could not be used to review high-level
policy decisions. On the other hand, some saw the exception as
severely limiting what otherwise would have been a very broad
waiver of sovereign immunity.”93
The seminal case regarding interpretation of the exception
and the scope of the waiver is Dalehite v. United States.94 In that
negligence case, explosions destroyed much of Texas City,
Texas and killed hundreds of people.95 The cause of the explo-
sions was fertilizer the government made and shipped to Europe
as post-war aid.96 The easily-ignitable fertilizer was packaged in
flammable paper containers with no hazard warning, leading to
large explosions during loading onto ships.97 The plaintiffs al-
leged negligence by the large body of officials and employees
involved in the program.98 Though the Supreme Court did not
determine where the line for discretion ends, it held that the
actions of the federal government—the decision to start the pro-
gram and the actions taken in aid of the program—were not
actionable as they involved some measure of discretion.99 The
Court noted that “[w]here there is room for policy judgment
and decision there is discretion. It necessarily follows that acts of
subordinates in carrying out the operations of government in
accordance with official directions cannot be actionable.”100
Critics of the decision noted its language was incredibly broad
and could potentially encompass almost everything “except the
most routine postal truck injury-type cases.”101
91 Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
92 Id.
93 Id.
94 Id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15 (1953)).
95 Id.
96 Id.
97 Id. at 294–95.
98 Id. at 295.
99 Id.
100 Id. (citing Dalehite v. United States, 346 U.S. 15, 35–36 (1953)).
101 Id. at 296.
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In United States v. S.A. Empresa De Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), a 1984 case addressing FAA delegation, the Su-
preme Court attempted to clarify its position and understanding
of the discretionary function exemption.102 The Varig Court
held that the discretionary function exemption barred the plain-
tiff’s FTCA suit challenging the FAA’s decision to delegate re-
sponsibility for compliance with FAA safety regulations to the
aircraft manufacturer and its means of monitoring compli-
ance.103 “The Varig Court explained that Congress included the
discretionary function exception ‘to prevent judicial second-
guessing of legislative and administrative decisions grounded in
social, economic, and political policy through the medium of a
tort suit.’”104 The Court stressed that the exception not only pro-
tects discretionary acts of the government in its conduct regulat-
ing role but also protects its policy judgments.105 Later Supreme
Court decisions defined the outer limits of the discretionary
function exemption,106 stating that the exemption effectively
does not apply when a statute, regulation, or policy specifically
prescribes a course of action for a government employee to fol-
low.107 It is within this legal framework that this Comment con-
siders the FTCA as a potential remedy for plaintiffs wronged by
negligent government acts related to the Boeing 737 MAX
crashes.
IV. ANALYSIS
The legal issues facing Boeing and the FAA are extensive and
are not fully explored in this Comment.108 These include law-
suits against Boeing by the families of the victims, claims for
compensation from airlines that have unfulfilled orders for the
737 MAX, and lawsuits by Boeing shareholders alleging fiduci-
ary breaches.109 While these suits address ancillary problems,
102 Id. (citing United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense
(Varig Airlines), 467 U.S. 797 (1984)).
103 Id. at 298.
104 Id. (quoting Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 813–14).
105 Id.
106 Id. at 301.
107 Id. at 302 (citing Berkowitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536 (1988)).
108 See Arthur I. Willner, Raymond L. Mariani & Emily K. Doty, Recent Develop-
ments in Aviation Law – 2019, 85 J. AIR L. & COM. 221, 250–58 (2020).
109 Sinéad Baker, Here Are All the Investigations and Lawsuits that Boeing and the
FAA are Facing After the 737 Max Crashes Killed Almost 350 People, BUS. INSIDER (June
24, 2019), https://www.businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-crisis-list-lawsuits-in-
vestigations-faces-faa-2019-5 [https://perma.cc/KM4E-VS7E]; Tom Hals & Tracy
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they do not get to the heart of the issue—there are serious flaws
in the aircraft certification process that allowed the 737 MAX to
fly. These structural failures fall into a few specific categories,
each of which can be addressed through legislation or through
FTCA claims against the FAA. The JATR report took issue with
the FAA’s failures to: (1) designate flight-path-altering changes
as “significant” changes, which would have subjected the certifi-
cation to stricter standards;110 (2) conduct whole aircraft inspec-
tion, determining how MCAS would interplay with other
systems;111 (3) delegate inspection duty to individuals or entities
with MCAS expertise;112 (4) immediately ground the 737
MAX;113 and (5) take steps to ensure the impartiality of dele-
gated safety inspectors with compromising ties to Boeing.114 Two
primary issues include: (1) the meaning of “qualified private”
individuals under the statute authorizing the FAA to delegate its
safety inspection authority; and (2) whether the director of the
FAA has full discretion to determine who constitutes a qualified
private individual.
A. THE FTCA AS AN AVENUE TO FAA ACCOUNTABILITY
Federal agencies such as the FAA are largely shielded from
lawsuits for negligence and other claims under the discretionary
function exemption of the FTCA.115 Under the exemption,
claims cannot be brought against government employees who,
while executing a duty prescribed by statute or regulation, per-
form a “discretionary function or duty on the part of a federal
agency or any employee of the government, whether or not the
discretion involved be abused.”116 Since Congress did not define
a “discretionary function,” the scope of this exemption has
Rucinski, Lawsuit Against Boeing Seeks to Hold Board Liable for 737 MAX Problems,
REUTERS (Nov. 18, 2019, 3:32 PM), https://reuters.com/article/us-boeing-
737max-lawsuit-board/lawsuit-against-boeing-seeks-to-hold-board-liable-for-737-
max-problems-idUSKBN1XS2I3 [perma.cc/M9T3-QB2Q]; Boeing Settles First Law-
suit With 737 Max Crash Families, DW (Sept. 25, 2019), https://dw.com/en/boe-
ing-settles-first-lawsuit-with-737-max-crash-families/a-50587098 [perma.cc/5P4Q-
YZNJ].
110 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., BOEING 737 MAX FLIGHT CONTROL SYSTEM OBSER-
VATIONS, FINDINGS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS, at I (2019).
111 Id. at 6.
112 Id. at 26.
113 Id. at 49.
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largely been borne out by judicial decisions. Courts use a gener-
alized two-part test to determine if the exemption applies.117
First, the Court determines whether the action is discretionary,
involving “an element of judgment or choice” in the absence of
a law or policy that prescribes a course of action.”118 Second, if
the conduct is discretionary, the judgment must be “the kind
that the discretionary function exception was designed to
shield”—those actions based on policy analysis.119
In the case of the 737 MAX certification process, there are
three areas where fault may be found and where the discretion-
ary function exemption may apply: (1) the FAA’s delegation of
portions of the certification process to Boeing via the FAA’s
ODA program;120 (2) FAA oversight of the process by the FAA’s
Boeing Aviation Safety Oversight Office (BASOO);121 and (3)
the issuance of the amended type certificate for the 737 MAX
with MCAS installed.122
1. Delegation of the Certification Process to Boeing
While it is undisputed that the FAA is allowed to delegate cer-
tification authority to private parties and that the ODA program
as a whole is a discretionary function,123 it is worth questioning
whether delegating the MCAS certification process falls under
the FTCA exemption. In 1984, the Supreme Court faced a simi-
lar situation in the Varig Airlines case. Following an accident that
killed 124 people involving a Boeing 707 aircraft, plaintiffs tried
to file suit against the FAA alleging negligence in “failing to in-
spect certain elements of aircraft design” before issuing certifica-
tion. Plaintiffs took specific issue with the “spot-check” FAA
review method and the application of that method to the air-
craft involved in the case.124
The Supreme Court held the discretionary function exemp-
tion shielded the FAA because its decisions about how to con-
duct its compliance review are discretionary actions “of the most
117 Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 536–37 (1988).
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 26.
121 Id.
122 Id. at 9.
123 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 807 (1984).
124 Id. at 819.
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basic kind.”125 The FAA was within its statutory rights to consider
the resources it has available, decide how to delegate its certifi-
cation authority, and determine how it would oversee the desig-
nee’s inspection process.126 The statute authorizes the FAA to
delegate to a qualified private person a matter related to issuing
certificates or examination and testing necessary to issue a certif-
icate.127 Because the statute does not describe a specific course
of action to be taken by the FAA or designee in the certification
process, the Court ruled that such a decision was within the dis-
cretion of the FAA and the designee.128 While the Court was
correct that the statute’s language is broad and general, Con-
gress set forth a qualification which constrains the delegation:
the designee must be a qualified private individual.129 It is not
within the discretion of the FAA to designate an unqualified in-
dividual to conduct inspections or certify the aircraft. Here,
there are serious concerns about the qualifications of those per-
sons inspecting and certifying MCAS.130
Among other concerns, FAA engineers and Boeing employees
raised red flags about the lack of qualified engineers available to
review changes to the aircraft, including MCAS.131 In 2005, Con-
gress (in response to industry lobbying efforts) allowed Boeing
to choose the engineers who would assist with the FAA’s review
and certification process.132 Some FAA engineers have com-
mented that, over time, this change has led to an inability to
monitor what was happening at Boeing.133 During the 737
MAX’s development, two of the BASOO’s most prominent and
experienced engineers—who were responsible for flight control
systems including MCAS—resigned and were replaced by an en-
gineer with “little experience in flight controls” and a new hire
fresh out of school.134 “People who worked with the two [new]
engineers said they seemed ill-equipped to identify any
125 Id. at 819–20.
126 Id.; see also 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
127 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 807; 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
128 Varig Airlines, 467 U.S. at 805.
129 See supra Section III.B.
130 Natalie Kitroeff, David Gelles & Jack Nicas, The Roots of Boeing’s 737 Max







720 JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE [85
problems in a complex system like MCAS.”135 Furthermore,
while the FAA originally retained certification authority over
MCAS’s addition, it later delegated that authority to Boeing.136
With so much authority being delegated to Boeing, it is im-
portant to determine whether those involved in the Boeing
ODA are qualified private people within the meaning of the stat-
ute. Federal regulations outlining the qualifications and duties
of ODAs are a good starting point to examine who counts as a
qualified private individual.137 To qualify, an applicant must
generally have sufficient facilities, resources, and experience to
conduct the duties that have been delegated to them—in this
case, certifying the changes made to the aircraft, including
MCAS.138 It is likely well within the FAA’s discretion to deter-
mine if the engineers that Boeing would assign to this task are
qualified in their engineering capabilities. However, it is the re-
sponsibility of the ODA Holder (Boeing) to “[e]nsure that no
conflicting non-ODA duties or other interference affects the
performance of authorized functions by ODA Unit mem-
bers.”139 Accordingly, Boeing has a duty to ensure no undue
pressure or influence, such as a race to produce a plane before a
competitor, affects the diligence of engineers tasked with certify-
ing the safety of the new systems. It stands to reason that Boe-
ing’s inability to ensure it meets this responsibility could render
it unqualified to hold an ODA designation. Therefore, if the
FAA knew economic pressures and factors other than plane
safety guided Boeing’s directions to its inspecting engineers,
then the FAA delegated its certification authority to an unquali-
fied individual, which it cannot do.140
There is evidence that, throughout the 737 MAX certification
process, Boeing placed profit-motivated pressures on its employ-
ees and the FAA. According to the JATR’s findings, “signs were
reported of undue pressures on Boeing ODA engineering unit
members . . . performing certification activities on the B737
MAX program, which further erodes the level of assurance in
this system of delegation.”141 According to a former Boeing engi-
neer, the company “puts its 737 MAX engineers under immense
135 Id.
136 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 26.
137 See 14 C.F.R. §§ 183.47, 183.57 (2020).
138 Id. § 183.47(a).
139 Id. § 183.57(c).
140 See 49 U.S.C. § 44702(d).
141 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
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pressure to lower production costs and to downplay new fea-
tures to avoid scrutiny” by the FAA.142 The engineer said he saw
“a lack of sufficient resources to do the job in its entirety.”143
Given how intertwined Boeing’s officials are with the FAA, it is
possible that the FAA was at least aware of the possibility of un-
due pressure or influence being asserted on the engineers re-
sponsible for the certification.144 Given the evidence of undue
pressure and influence, the perceived inability of the Boeing en-
gineers’ ability to complete their safety certification directives,
and the qualification requirements of ODA Holders, there is a
colorable argument that the FAA’s designation to Boeing of cer-
tification authority over MCAS was to an unqualified private in-
dividual, which is forbidden by the statute.145 This could
potentially bar the application of the discretionary function ex-
emption and allow families of those killed in the crashes to
bring FTCA suits against the FAA.
If the first prong of the Berkovitz test is not met because au-
thority was delegated to private individuals who were not quali-
fied, there is no need to move on to the second prong—the
discretionary function exemption does not apply. However,
even if the second prong does not need to be satisfied, analysis
can still demonstrate the principle that courts strive not to sec-
ond guess agency policy decisions.146 A growing body of evi-
dence suggests the delegation in this case was not made on
policy grounds, but was instead intended to tilt the scales in Boe-
ing’s race against Airbus.147 Permitted policy considerations ar-
guably do not include the economic interests of a single
airplane manufacturer.
142 Alexandra Ma, A Former Boeing 737 Max Engineer Said He Was ‘Incredibly Pres-
surized’ to Keep Costs Down and Downplay New Features to Avoid FAA Scrutiny, BUS.
INSIDER (July 29, 2019, 5:24 AM), https://businessinsider.com/boeing-737-max-
former-engineer-pressure-costs-avoid-faa-scrutiny-2019-7 [perma.cc/8JLN-HF5A].
143 Id.
144 See Kitroeff et al., supra note 130.
145 See supra Section III.B.
146 Fishback & Killefer, supra note 87, at 302 (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
147 Thomas Kaplan, After Boeing Crashes, Sharp Questions About Industry Regulat-
ing Itself, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 26, 2019). https://nytimes.com/2019/03/26/us/polit-
ics/boeing-faa.html [perma.cc/YM2X-7W89].
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2. Improper FAA Oversight and Issuing the Certificate—A Dead
End
The most glaring and well-publicized criticism of the 737
MAX crisis is that there is a significant lack of meaningful FAA
oversight over the Boeing ODA program and the 737 MAX certi-
fication process.148 Throughout the 737 MAX certification pro-
cess, the FAA continually delegated more of its oversight
responsibility to Boeing.149 Members of the BASOO program in
charge of oversight complained they were underqualified and
unable to understand the significance of MCAS.150 “For exam-
ple, during an initial project review, an FAA engineer failed to
detect that a manufacturer’s certification plan did not demon-
strate compliance with specific aviation regulations governing
design and construction of aircraft flight controls.”151 However,
the FAA’s ODA oversight duties are even more generalized and
vague, requiring little more than merely overseeing the ODA in
unspecified terms.152 The FAA engineers had no explicit duty to
review MCAS themselves.153 It is likely within the discretionary
function exemption for the FAA to determine what oversight is
appropriate and who to place on any oversight committee re-
garding a specific certification, as the Varig Airlines case states.154
Beyond the Varig decision, other circuit courts have rein-
forced the point that oversight-based allegations of negligence
on the part of the FAA are barred by the discretionary function
exemption.155 In Alinsky v. United States, victims of an aircraft col-
lision tried to sue the FAA under the FTCA, alleging, among
other things, that the agency was negligent in contracting out
and overseeing the training and appointing of aircraft control-
lers.156 Explaining that the discretionary function exemption
shielded the FAA, the Seventh Circuit stated:
Here, Congress authorized the FAA to enter into contracts, as
necessary, to carry out the functions of the FAA, and thus the
148 See, e.g., Almond, supra note 86, at 15.
149 Id.
150 Id. at 16.
151 Id. at 15.
152 See 49 U.S.C. § 44736(a)(1).
153 Id.
154 United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig Air-
lines), 467 U.S. 797, 819–20 (1984).
155 Alinsky v. United States, 415 F.3d 639, 648 (7th Cir. 2005); Riggs v. Airbus
Helicopters, Inc., 939 F.3d 981, 992 n.2 (9th Cir. 2019).
156 Alinsky, 415 F.3d at 647.
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government did not violate a specific mandatory statute, regula-
tion or policy in hiring Midwest to provide training and oversight
at Meigs. The plaintiffs also fail to identify any mandatory statute
or regulation dictating how the FAA must oversee private con-
tractors or assure the contractor complies with federal regula-
tions and the contract provisions. Where the plaintiffs’ claim is
premised on negligent oversight, such a showing is imperative.157
Since the FAA made the discretionary decision to contract out
the selection, training, and oversight of air traffic controllers in
the case, the FAA was not open to attack for oversight failures.158
The Alinksy decision is distinguishable from the case of the
737 MAX and may provide a means of attacking the FAA for its
failed oversight. Alinksy focused on the FAA’s decision to dele-
gate to a third party authority to select and train air traffic con-
trollers.159 But here, the FAA retained certain oversight
authority, which it vested in the BASOO.160
According to the JATR report, “[t]he BASOO is required to
perform a certification function, including making findings of
compliance of retained (non-delegated) requirements, while
also performing the oversight function of the Boeing ODA. The
BASOO must have the resources to carry out these two primary
functions without compromise.”161 Therefore, the FAA may not
have provided enough adequate, qualified individuals to admin-
ister its retained oversight over the 737 MAX certification. Some
of the engineers involved in the small oversight team were re-
cent graduates and people unfamiliar with MCAS.162
The JATR report found that there were twenty-four engineers
on the BASOO team, and that the allocated staffing levels may
not have been sufficient to “carry out the work associated with
retained items and with the conduct of oversight duties.”163 This
critical understaffing could have played a part in some key over-
sights, including the failure to list the appropriate MCAS correc-
tion. Initially, Boeing determined and submitted to the FAA that
MCAS limited automated corrections in the airplane’s flight up
to 0.6 degrees.164 However, the final system design was submit-
157 Id.
158 Id. at 648.
159 Id.
160 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at VII.
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ted and reviewed with a 2.5-degree limitation instead of 0.6.165
Boeing decided such a change was insignificant, and so it was
never reviewed by FAA oversight engineers, who were unaware
of the change until after the crashes.166 Among other factors,
this was one of the key causes of the system failure.
Even if Boeing had disclosed this change to the FAA, it is un-
likely the change would have been noticed or further examined
due to inadequate staffing at the FAA.167 Moreover, while the
FAA has discretion to decide how to conduct oversight over its
retained functions, that discretion is still bound by statutory lim-
its.168 Thus, if the FAA had a legal duty to provide adequate and
qualified supervision of certain aspects of the certification, and
the team dedicated to doing so did not have the staff to accom-
plish it, it could be argued the FAA acted outside of its discre-
tion in allocating its employees. At the same time, however, the
FAA’s decisions of how to allocate limited resources are exactly
the sort of circumstance that typically invites judicial
deference.169
Other circuit court decisions relating to the policy prong of
the FTCA’s discretionary function exemption indicate that, ab-
sent clear, specific statutory mandates, the FAA is likely within its
rights to consider a wide variety of policy decisions.170 For exam-
ple, the Second Circuit has held that the government’s use of a
chemical agent was discretionary, as were its contracting deci-
sions in performing field tests with that agent.171 Similarly, the
First and Ninth Circuits have held that, once a private contrac-
tor is delegated authority to perform some function, the govern-
ment is not liable for the contractor’s failure to protect its
employees from dangers typically within the government’s pur-
view.172 But that discretion is not without limits. A footnote in
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scope.173 The Court noted that: “While the initial decision to
undertake and maintain lighthouse service was a discretionary
judgment . . . failure to maintain the lighthouse in good condi-
tion subjected the Government to suit under the FTCA [be-
cause] the latter course of conduct did not involve any
permissible exercise of policy judgment.”174
Here, it was within the FAA’s discretion to delegate some cer-
tification responsibility to Boeing and to retain some for itself.175
But once it has decided to retain certain oversight duties, it can
only exercise policy judgments that are permissible.176 Economic
considerations, FAA resources, and public safety are all valid,
permissible policy considerations that should not be subject to
judicial scrutiny.177 However, it is questionable whether the
FAA’s consideration of Boeing’s desire to meet deadlines and
compete with Airbus is a permissible consideration, and there is
evidence that those interests were considered when the FAA was
deciding who would conduct the oversight.178 “A former FAA
safety engineer who was directly involved in certifying the MAX
[8] said that halfway through the certification process, ‘we were
asked by management to re-evaluate what would be delegated.
Management thought we had retained too much at the
FAA.’”179 In a troubling episode, a senior Boeing engineer,
whose job was to act on behalf of the FAA in issuing certifica-
tions, pushed back against Boeing management’s demands for
less stringent testing of a feature by the new engineers.180 After
initially rejecting the engineer’s call for stricter safety testing so
that he could comply with FAA regulations, Boeing manage-
ment eventually caved to his requests.181 But “[l]ess than a
month after his peers had backed him, Boeing abruptly re-
moved him from the program even before conducting the test-
ing he’d advocated.”182 This incident highlights a consistent
173 Id. at 303.
174 Id. (citing Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 n.3 (1988)).
175 Borfitz, supra note 77.
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problem with the Boeing ODA program: “Many engineers, em-
ployed by Boeing while officially designated to be the FAA’s eyes
and ears, faced heavy pressure from Boeing managers to limit
safety analysis and testing so the company could meet its sched-
ule and keep down costs.”183 Boeing’s costs and schedules are
not likely the type of policy considerations envisioned by the
Berkovitz Court.184 However, in the absence of strict, expressly
delineated statutory processes that the FAA is bound to follow in
designating oversight authority, this mode of attack is probably
weaker than one based on the qualified private person
grounds.185
3. Is the Federal Tort Claims Act the Right Tool?
Even if it is possible to sue the FAA under the FTCA, a ques-
tion remains regarding the likelihood that private FTCA suits
against the FAA would be effective in ensuring the FAA is not
beholden to private companies, like Boeing, and that the FAA
performs its duty of ensuring the safety of aircraft without un-
due private influence.186 It has been noted that the FTCA makes
it hard to sue the FAA for negligence and that it would be more
prudent to sue Boeing directly.187 As one aviation lawyer re-
marked, “At the start, middle and end, regardless of the role the
FAA played, Boeing, Boeing, and Boeing is responsible for the
safety of the airplane.”188 Some feel that the role of investigating
the nature of the relationship between the FAA and Boeing is a
task better left to the legislature.189 After all, victims who want to
be made whole can always sue Boeing, which has agreed to set-
tlements of over $1 million for some crash victims.190 However,
if the FAA is susceptible to “capture,” or is already captured, law-
suits against one of the biggest companies in the industry may
help, but would not address the root of the problem. Thus, two
183 Id.
184 See Berkovitz v. United States, 486 U.S. 531, 538 n.3 (1988).
185 See id. at 547.
186 See United States v. S.A. Empresa de Viacao Aerea Rio Grandense (Varig
Airlines), 467 U.S. 797, 804 (1984) (“In the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49
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questions must be addressed; is the FAA “captured”, and if it is,
could lawsuits pursuant to the FTCA help?
B. AGENCY CAPTURE AND THE FAA
Regulatory agencies, such as the FAA, face the Herculean task
of overseeing a technological domain that seems to constantly
increase in complexity. With limited resources and personnel,
agency cooperation with industry leaders, who often have vastly
superior resources and technical expertise, is an inescapable re-
ality.191 But occasionally, the interests of the private parties sub-
ject to regulation become so intertwined with the agency that
they lead to undue control and domination of the agency’s reg-
ulatory authority. This phenomenon is referred to as agency
“capture” and has “been all but universally seen as a negative
consequence.”192 Agency capture occurs when a private com-
pany, through lobbying or otherwise, usurps the agency’s public
policy considerations in favor of the private company’s own self-
ish interests.193 “It has become widely accepted, not only by pub-
lic interest lawyers, but by academic critics, legislators, judges,
and even by some agency members, that the cooperative over-
representation of regulated or client interests in the process of
agency decision results in a persistent policy bias in favor if these
interests.”194
The FAA is an agency that is widely considered “captured” by
the airline industry.195 This conclusion is supported by findings
of various investigations into the 737 MAX certification pro-
gram. A New York Times report found that many top agency offi-
cials “shuffle[ ] between the government and the industry.”196
Boeing was treated more as a client than as a private party regu-
lated by the FAA.197 Managers within the FAA’s oversight pro-
gram over the Boeing ODA were reportedly pressured to make
sure Boeing met deadlines to deliver the 737 MAX to its custom-
ers.198 Problems encountered by Boeing engineers tasked with
191 See Niles, supra note 55, at 393.
192 Id. at 390.
193 Id.
194 Id.
195 See id. at 405.
196 Kitroeff et al., supra note 130.
197 Id.
198 Id.
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certification were not reported to disinterested FAA officials, but
to Boeing executives.199
Concerns about the impartiality of the FAA and fears of its
capture by the industry are not new or unique to the aviation
industry. The rise of the administrative state has naturally led to
an increased number of agencies, and thus increased concern
over agency capture.200 For the FAA in particular, a primary
source of concern stems from what has been referred to as the
FAA’s dual mandate—beyond just regulating airline safety, the
FAA is also tasked with fostering air commerce.201 “[Thus f]rom
its inception, the FAA was given the difficult task of balancing
two interests which might be frequently, if not inherently, in
conflict: the protection of airline safety on one hand, and the
‘fostering’ of successful air commerce, and consequently, the
promotion of airline profitability, on the other.”202
While that language was removed in subsequent amendments
to the statute, the influence of the dual mandate remains.203
While other industries do rely on “audited self-regulation” by
private companies, the FAA is particularly susceptible to “hyper-
influence” by regulated parties since it “relies almost exclusively
on self-regulation.”204 Given that concerns about the influence
of the aviation industry on the FAA stretch back over forty years
and that the prevalence of companies like Boeing in the FAA
certification process has only increased in that time,205 it seems
that the legislature and the agency itself may not be capable of
crafting solutions to the problem. A critical examination of
some of the proposed changes and findings by the JATR reveals
why FTCA suits are a necessary aspect of FAA reform.
In its report on the FAA’s delegation of certification authority
to Boeing, the JATR panel concluded that “in the [737] MAX
program, the FAA had inadequate awareness of MCAS function
which, coupled with limited involvement, resulted in the inabil-
ity of the FAA to provide an independent assessment of the ade-
quacy of the Boeing proposed certification activities associated
with MCAS.”206 This statement alone is rather shocking. The fact
199 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 29.
200 Niles, supra note 55, at 386–88.
201 Id. at 407.
202 Id.
203 Id. at 408.
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205 Id. at 409.
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that the FAA was willing to certify the 737 MAX even though it
could not determine the adequacy of Boeing’s certification ac-
tivites indicates a disturbing level of incompetence or industry
influence—or both—within the FAA. To remedy this, the panel
issued Recommendation R5, “that the FAA conduct a workforce
review of the BASOO engineer staffing level to ensure there is a
sufficient number of experienced specialists to adequately per-
form certification and oversight duties, commensurate with the
extent of work being performed by Boeing.”207 However, given
the Court’s broad understanding of the discretionary function
exemption, the FAA could likely meet this duty by simply stating
that current staffing levels are adequate—it would be acting
within its discretion in making that determination. Even if the
statue were amended to require “adequate” staffing, it would
still be up to the FAA (and by extension, Boeing) to determine
what that means.
The JATR also recommended that “[t]he FAA should review
the Boeing ODA work environment and ODA manual to ensure
the Boeing ODA engineering unit members are working with-
out any undue pressure when they are making decisions on be-
half of the FAA.”208 This would amount to having FAA officials
connected with Boeing determine whether Boeing is exerting
undue pressure on the engineers, and given the broad scope of
the discretionary function exemption, Boeing officials delegated
authority would have the discretion to conclude the engineers
operate free of undue pressure. Other JATR recommendations
involve requiring “holistic, integrated aircraft-level ap-
proach[es]” to certification209—that ODA engineers consider
how adding critical technological systems like MCAS might ef-
fect other processes of the aircraft.210 These recommendations
seem so obvious that it is hard to believe they have not been
considered by the FAA, fortifying contentions that the agency is
subject to industry control, which will only be loosened by bring-
ing FTCA claims against it.
For a captured agency like the FAA, there is very little stand-
ing in the way of allowing the industry to apply undue pressure
absent judicial intervention. The lobbying groups behind the
airline industry are considered some of the most powerful and
207 Id. at VIII.
208 Id.
209 Id.
210 Id. at VIII–IX.
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effective in the United States. The FAA is largely run by people
with significant connections to the major airlines, and who seem
to side increasingly with the industry on issues.211 Unfortunately,
the only catalyst for any semblance of change in the FAA tends
to be the public outcry following devastating accidents that cost
hundreds of lives.212 But these incidents are few and far between
and changes are typically not implemented once the outrage
subsides. For example, in response to a catastrophic crash of an
airplane off the coast of Long Island in the late 1990s, the “FAA
implemented several heightened safety measures and organized
a White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security.”213
This commission, among other things, proposed thirty-one rec-
ommendations for tightening airport security, especially in the
face of terrorism.214 But those procedures were not seriously im-
plemented by the FAA until after the September 11, 2001 terror-
ist attack.215 Most observers agreed that “had those
recommendations been implemented within the spirit and in-
tent of the commission, the plans to attack on September 11
might have been detected well before they occurred.”216 Al-
lowing FTCA suits to proceed against the FAA for acts outside
the scope of the discretionary function exemption would place
the FAA on notice that it should conduct its duties in accor-
dance with one of its primary purposes—to promote safety.
V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of congressional action amending legislation
to implement oversight requirements and limits on delegation,
the FAA might not curb its own excesses. A slew of small, but
specific amendments could go some way to creating meaningful
change.
First, the statute should require that an impartial FAA engi-
neer have a non-delegable duty to conduct a cursory examina-
tion of a proposed change and make the initial determination
of whether it is considered significant or minor. In the case of
the 737 MAX, the JATR concluded that it was Boeing engineers,
likely under pressure from Boeing management, who made the
determination that a change in MCAS that increased the ability
211 Niles, supra note 55, at 415.
212 Id. at 409.
213 Id.
214 Id. at 410.
215 Id. at 410–11.
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of the system to change the pitch of the aircraft was not signifi-
cant and did not need further FAA review.217 Had the FAA over-
sight engineers seen the change, they could have caught the
mistakes that caused the accidents.218
Along those lines, the statute should mandate that any auto-
mated system that can alter the flight path of an aircraft without
input from the pilot is, by definition, a significant change that
needs to be reviewed independently by FAA engineers. Given
the stakes involved, it makes no sense that a change which can
alter the flight of the aircraft without input could be seen as
anything other than significant. Finally, amending the statute to
require the FAA to retain authority to appoint specific Boeing
engineers who will participate in the ODA program, rather than
delegating that duty to Boeing, is another solution to part of the
problem.
But in the face of Congress’ inaction, the judicial system pro-
vides hope of holding the FAA accountable when delegating au-
thority to private industry leaders like Boeing.
217 JOINT AUTHS. TECH. REV., supra note 110, at 13–14.
218 Id. at 14.
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